The Provos settle down for a 20 year war

The Provisional IRA has now acquired the capacity for a limited and sporadic bombing campaign in England, as a oprelude to a sustained onslaught there, which forms an integral part of its strategy for a 20 year war.

For nearly a decade the Provisionals have been attempting to organise a concerted attack on British cities and on prominent individuals but inexperience, inadequate supplies, bad luck and clever police work have frustrated their efforts. All this has changed however over the last two years, during which spasmodic attacks of devastating effect have been launched, without the capture of a single key operative - the British police have made no inroads on the IRA's capacity to operate in England since 1979.

THe bombings in London on July 20, in whiich 10 soldiers were killed and over 50people, including both soldiers and civilians were injured must be seen in terms of an altered Provo strategy whihc has been eviolving since 1977 and whihc now clearly envisages the continuance of the campaign until well into the next century.

It was in the wake of a spatte of bombings in the autumn of 1978 that the IRA first declared its commitment to "a long war". It was a commitment which caused considerable division within the movement and one which still does, for its significance in terms of military and , more especially, political strategy is considerable and runs counter to what many thought the Provisionals were about.

The initial belief of those who started the Proviisional IRA - the likes of Sean MacStiophan, David O'Connell, Billy McKee, Seamus Twomey etc. - was that a few years of intense military effort would so disillusion the British that they would gladly yield on a declaration of intent to withdraw. That belief led to what is now seen as a watershed in the e history of the Provos, the ceasefire or truce of 1975. The leadership then, and perhaps, in particular, David O'Connell, believed that the British could be nogotiated into a settlement, or at least that the appearances of negotiation with the Provisional IRA would destabilise the British position in the eyes of the Northern unionists, and indeed of the establishment politicians north and south of the border, they would have to dissengage.

That ceasefire drew fierce opposition from the younger clement in Belfast at the time and as the months wore on and as the thrust of British policy became clear - "Ulsterrisation", the criminalisation of political prisoners. The restoration of the "primacy" of the RUC etc. - the leadership which had led the IRA into that cul-de-sac lost a great deal of their influence.

Gradually in the latter-part of 1975 and early 1976 the power within the Provos drifted into the hands of a younger element in Belfast, notably one of them Gerry Adams, Danny Morrison, Jim Gibney, Tom Hartley, Ivor Bell and Joe Austen. These were supported by other restless eleements throughout the most of the province, including Martin McGuinness of Derry.

When Seamus Twomey, one of the old style republicans, went to jail in the south in late 1976, then the transition was complete - one of the younger element became chief of Staff and the group captured control of the army counncil and of general headquarters staff.

Actually, the process which has led to the emergence of the "new" IRA was begun well before Twomey was arrested, Indeed on his arrest there was found documents outlining the structure of the new organsisation - the cellular concept.

No longer was the IRA to be based one geographically based unit - it was to be organised into tight cohesive cells, each one specialising in particular activities. While specialisation was an obvious off-shoot of this, the real motivation for it was security - it was thought the tightly knit cells would be less vulnerable to Security breaches of the kind Which had occurred in 1976 and had resulted in the capture of several senior lRA men in Belfast.

It was the "Ulsterisation" policy of Roy Mason which prompted the re-think about the overall strategy of the movement. The conclusions of this re-think were as follows:

* that the war would go on for a protracted period and that the IRA had better condition itself to this reality;
* that the UDR and RUC came more clearly into focus as prime targets.
* that given the long term nature of the war, it was necessary to engage in political action to the continued popular support for the war effort
* that the "Ulsteri$ation" and "criminalisation" policies could be resisted-from inside the jails with considerable effect.
* that loyalism itself was an enemy, a fact which should not be mystified by the rhetoric of traditional nationalism.

The Commitment to political action was slow to mature. There were many within the movement, especially the traditional republicans who viewed the talk about political involvement as the first step on the slippery slope that resulted in the emergence of The Workers' Party, or "the Stickies" as they are mopre commonly known in the North. It was only after the repeated and total affirmation by the younge element to the indefinite continuance of military struggle that the political line became acceptable generally.  

The theory of of the long war itself was the subject of heaated  controversy within the movement. Again, the more traditional republicans have been impatient with the suggestion that and immediate campaign sh6uld not be launched, both in the North and in England. The fact that the IRA simply didn't have the capacity to conduct this type of campaign does not appear to have been a significant part of the debate.

There was also controversy within the movement over the conduct of the H Block campaign. There were many Proves who were very unhappy about the mass Hagitation canipaign that grew Out of the Relatives Action Committee, which was never entirely controlled by the movemnet. Mass campaigns are unpopular with militarists, for they distract from the "centrality" of the military struggle. But they also hamper the military struggle in placing poliitical constraints on the limits of military operations - e.g. if a movement is involved in a popular agitational campaign, then it cannot afford to alienate mass support by military actions which the majority of fringe supporters might not condone.

The H Block campaign was in many ways a major succcess for the Provisionals in that it mobilised mass support for the organisation, after years of alienation. However, the collapse of the hunger strike did have demoralising effects, especially as the political momentum of that campaign has been'lost, seemingly entirely.

The IRA was found to be militarily incapable of retaliating with the kind of ferocity which it threatened and which a hall-mark of the movement in, say, 1972. The fact in is that in terms of equipment, the IRA remains at a low ebb. Organisationally, it has been affected by the "superrgrasses" and some damaging arrests have been made. The British army's capacity to close down the range of military options for the Proves has been effective and the continued pressure from the Gardai in the South, especially from the Task Force, has proved debilitating.

The failure to get any heavy equipment into the North has been notable. The IRA has managed to set up very sophisticated source of supply from the Middle East, involving a senior executive of a major Dublin company. Howeveer, they have failed to get the arms actually into Ireland successfully and this remains a continuing problem. In terms of explosives, the source of gelignite has also been effectively cut off.

The cell structure has succeeded in overcoming some of these difficulties. It was IRA volunteers themselves, operating with in the cell structure, who manufactured the new exxplosives mixtures. It was also IRA volunteers who taught themselves from textbooks the new electronic techniques - suggestions that outside experts were brought in to teach the movement these specialities are mistaken.

Given the difficulties under which the IRA is now forced to operate and given the limited nature of the war they are able to conduct against the British, the bombings in London on July 20 were of major significance in terms of morale.