The IRA has to do what the IRA has to do
The Sinn Fein electoral wagon is slowing down. As a result, the IRA is likely to begin stepping up its war against the Northern state. Gene Kerrigan reports from Belfast and also interviews Sinn Fein's Danny Morrison on the party's recent successes and failures.
The belief that Sinn Fein is approaching its ceiling of votes is likely, according to republican sources to lead to a change in IRA military tactics. This may result in a return to a more intensive bombing of "econoomic targets". Within the Sinn Fein leadership it is now believed that the party is unlikely to out-poll the SDLP in the short term and secure a position as, the main representatives of the nationalist community in the North. The party will this month - after the new ward boundary arrangements are announced - work out its strategy for the 1985 local elections in the Six Counties. Sinn Fein may pered in its aim of maximisin'g its vote by e rule changes brought in by Margaret Thatcher after the electoral victory of Bobby Sands in Fermanagh-South Tyrone in 1981.
To some extent the impression that Sinn Fein was breathing down the SDLP's electoral neck was deliberately fostered by the Sinn Fein leadership - against the advice of, for instance, Gerry Adams - in order to enthuse the party's rank and file. There has been a reappraisal since the Euro elections in June, in which Sinn Fein - while retaining its percentage share of the nationalist vote - saw its overall voting figures fall from 102,000 to 91,000.
The "armalite and ballot paper" strategy remains the same, with the involvement in electoral politics and community activities being seen as a way of involving wider circles of sympathisers but with the central retained belief that only a continuous, and indefinite prolonged military, campaign will convince the British governmentt the state is ungovernable while the British remain.
The last couple of years of political activity have served to demonstrate that the Pro viisionals have a solid and sizeable amount of support. During this period the IRA adjusted its military tactics, avoiding as far as possible the kind of action which carries a high risk and which has the potential to alienate symmpathisers from Sinn Fein - such as the bombbing of "economic targets". Within the IRA thereis a belief that the authorities have taken advantage of the Mister Nice Guy tactics in order to claim that "normality" is returning. There is thus a move within the IRA to return to what one source described as "the types of operation which it was renowned for in the past".
According to republican sources the IRA deliberately moved away from some types of chancy operation - such as commercial bombings - in order to facilitate Sinn Fein's electoral strategy. Such militaerations httvtfa high attrition rate, in terms of members captured and of civilian casualties. One misstake can result in an atrocity which wipes out months of political work. Within the IRA it is now felt that the British have been taking advantage of this, claiming a partial return to normality, claiming that bombings are fewer than three years ago and that this is because they are on top of the security problems. Belfast city centre is now being advertised as one marvellous big shopping centre - whch it is - and some republicans point, for example, to Greet Victorial Street: "It used to be a derelict street, you go down there now it''s like LosAngeles at nighttime".
This is not just spite on behalf of the Provos. When the authorities emphasise that there is a return to normality they are making a political point - that the state is governable under a British rule despite the best efforts of the IRA. THe provos see a campaign of bombing as a way of undermining such claims and the prestige and credibility of the security forces.
The successes of Sinn Fein in the electoral field have acted as a political constraint on the IRA. Most IRA activity is now concentrated on teh IRA. Most IRA activity is now concentrated on the relentless lilling of members of the security forces, a military tactic which is certinly more acceptable to Sinn Fein supporters than is the bombing tactic. The killing of Sean Downes in front of TV cameras undermined the credibility of those in Belfast, London and Dublin who had claimed that the RUC was a reformed force and necessitated the entering òf caveats. In the nationalist ghettos, however, that claim of reform was never accepted. There is awareness that Downes was the fidteenth to die from a "baton round", some of the previous deaths being of children clearlt not involved in the voilence. TThe RUC shoot-to-kill policy, the resignation of the Armagh coroner, the complaints of lawyers about the "supergrass" tactic, have all emphasised that the Downes killing was special only because it was so public.
All of this created the circumstance in which Sinn Fein could make electoral gains even though the IRA was regularly killing members of the security forces in often horrific circumstances. I the short term, however, the Provos' political base is unlikely to spread very much wider. The electoral campaign was never seen by the Provos as being central to their strategy. The belief is firmly held that only a prolonged and inexorable military campaign will force political concessions from the British government. Unfortunately, there is all too uch historical evidence both here and internationlly to substantiate that belief. The nature of the conflict is such that the Provisionals have little leeway in changing miitary tactics. They are limited to killing members of the security forces individually, ususlly off duty, and mounting disruptions of the normality which the British seek to claim.
It is these circumstance which have provoked discussion within the IRA on the stepping up of the war against the state. Only the fear that masive disaffection by current sympathisers could lead to an obvious defeat in the 1985 local elections - which would be as much of a psychological blow as the previous victories have been a psycological boost - could put the brakes on this. Already, however, there is a beelief tha the electoral ceiling has been reached and that the intricacies of the electoral sustem will work against the Provos next year.
The Provisionals believe that in the 1985 local elections they will be harassed ad hampered by the emendment to the Representation of the people Act brought in after Bobby Sands won the Fermanagh-South Tyrone seat in 1981. The amendment prohibits pisoners from Standing in elections. British sources say tha this applies only to prisoners not to ex-prisoners. The provos, however, claim that it will be used to hamper them. They point to their attempt to stand ex-prisoner Kieran O'Donnell in a by-election in Dungannon and the insistence tha O'Donnell could not stand for election until five years had elapsed since his conviction. Since many of the Provo members most active in community politics are ex-prisoners, such harassment would hit them hard.
In such circumstances, or even prior to the elections if the IRA accept that the gains that are to be made have already been made the war will be stepped up, using the methods which have by now become traditional. Even in such circumstances, with some newly-won political support draining away, it can be guaranteed that the activities of the security forces will continue to be such as to consolidate a sufficient political base for the Provos to continue their war as long as they consider necessary.
In the South the debate following the death of Sean Downes was not about the relationship between the forces of this state and the RUC - instead the debate quickly collapsed into a farcical examination of the fine print of Section 31 of the Broadcasting Act, to see if there are any more blinkers we can put on.
In the light of this, of the successes and setbacks which Sinn Fein has had in the establishment of a clear political base, and of the possibility of the stepping up of the war by the IRA, Magill interviewed Sinn Fein's Director of Publiicity, Danny Morrison.
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In the European elections in June Sinn Fein failed to retain the 100,000 votes they had achieved in the Westminster election. It fell to 91,000. Why?
Well, firstly we made a mistake in that we scientifically estimated that we would not out-poll John Hume or take the seat, sometime before the actual election. Then, inside the steering committee in the six counties, it was probably my bidding - because people like Gerry Adams, for example, were saying that we shouldn't be pitching the stakes high 0and I was arguing successfully with the majority that in order to enthuse our people we needed to give them an ambitious objective. And that ambitious objective was that we could out-poll Hume.
Now, we believed that we would have held onto the 102,000 votes which we had achieved in June '83. We believed that as a result of ongoing constituency work we would have taken extra votes. We thought that in the three constituencies which we didn't contest in June 1983, that we were bound to pick up some votes out of those three areas - that is, Strangford, North Down and East Antrim. So, even allowing for a lower poll we still believed that we would have taken an increased share of the nationalist vote. But we didn't do it. In fact we held on precisely to the exact percen tage as in June '83.
Analysing why we didn't even pull out the 103,000 obviously a lot of soul-searching has to be done. And perrhaps some unpalatable conclusions reached. To look at things over which we had no control: John Hume definitely had an advantage as a sitting MEP. In retrospect, not using the forum turned out to be as advantageous to him as if he had used it. He fought it on European issues, he was the sitting MEP, and a lot of people, farming people, who classify themselves as our supporters - not all of them, obviously - but some people told me, yes, they voted for Hume. They voted for us in June, they voted for Hume this time because they saw the European election not as a run h election but as one concerned with their agricultural innterests. So they opted for Hume. Another explanation for Hume's large vote is that the Alliance absolutely an orally collapsed. Will that vote go back to Allian e in the local government elections? It's obvious that se tions of the Catholic nationalist middle class, clearly perceiving the SDLP to be in trouble - and probably hyped it up and actually created the motivation for them to cross from the Alliance to Hume - and the fantastic machine that we had; I mean, I've no doubt that we actually drove SDLP voters to the polls on June 14.
Hume got a big vote. Now, why did we get a reduced vote? The unpalatable things are that perhaps it's not enntirely possible to totally harmonise the relationship between armed struggle and electoral politics. And the one thing I have to emphasise, that all republicans are united on, is that electoral politics will not remove the British from Ireland. Only armed struggle will do that. If the IRA was an absolutely huge well-armed guerilla army there would probably be no need for electoral politics. Because in most revolutionary struggles going to the ballot box takes place at the conclusion, the successful conclusion of the armed struggle - as for example with the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe - rather than in the middle of the guerilla war, as is experimentally happening with the republican movement in the six counties.
The public and supporters just don't blindly accept everything that the IRA does, and at times they will probbably register some form of disapproval, either withdrawing support or by not voting for Sinn Fein. Most republicans can understand, sympathise with, operations where Crown forces or people connected with the establishment are clearly the identified targets - but where an operation goes wrong, there is a tendency there, it actually hurts the IRA and the only way it's tangible is probably through hurting Sinn Fein electora11y. Having said that, I think there's very little room for the IRA to lower its range, so to speak. I don't think the IRA has that much manoeuvrability and therefore I think we just have to live with the fact that there's always going to be this apparent contradiction. But I still think that our contradictions are less than the contraadictions facing the SDLB, for example, attempting to sell a constitutional approach to reunification, and the contraadictions which the Dublin government faces. Everybody has contradictions, but I think the contradiction between the armalite and the ballot box is slight in comparison.
If the voters who went to Hume because they _perceived the SDLP to be under threat from Sinn Fein remain with the SDLP, and even if we go on increasing our support, largely from new people going on the register, young people, it could well be that we will not overtake the SDLP in the forseeable future.
The involvement in electoral politics was paralleled by the rise of a new leadership in Sinn Fein: young, leftwing, Northern. While accepting the change, some of the older generations such as Ruairi 0 Bradaigh and Daithi 0 Conaill made no secret of their disapproval. Has the electoral settback affected that division?
No. I mean, nobody is questioning the correctness of the electoral intervention. We didn't improve on our percenntage share of the vote - that hasn't added grist to the mill, that hasn't strengthened a non-existent opposition to the policy of the movement - it just doesn't exist.
And therefore, nobody suspects that myself or Gerry Adams or Martin McGuinness or any of these people who have a public profile, there's no room for doubt for one minute exactly what we believe in. So there's no fears there. Daithi O· Conaill was never opposed to electoral politics, so there'd be no contradiction, there'd be no arguument between us.
But the left-right division remains. The right are still there and the left has yet to prove that its ideas are paying of!
I think it has paid off. If you look at things from October 1982 onwards there have been occasions when, say for example, the IRA for whatever reason hasn't been as active, perhaps through some form of difficulties or other, for maybe a month at a time. You've had Sinn Fein electoral results making a big impact and demoralising the Brits and making the news in Britain and internationally, both in October '82 and June '83. Ken Livingstone's visit here in February '83, Gerry Adams going to London after the exxclusion order was lifted in July '83 - all of these things have been very important in terms of the struggle. I think the republican movement, through having elected representatives, has increased credibility. It does make it easier øfor example, Clive Soley was here talking to us two weeks ago - that makes it easier for people like that to engage in discussion and to' reelise that we haven't got horns and to realise that what we re saying, that there is validity to it.
Ostensibly there hils been a change from left to right in Sinn Fein, yet you say there is no conflict, no disagreement, and the main effect seems to be a more enthusiastic appproach to electoral politics. Have there really been any political changes, then?
There is a change, of course. There's been a change in the politics and a lot of people have been given their head and the movement is more open to discussion and debate and to persuasion. For example, we were opposed to the Amendment campaign in the Free State last year ....
But some of your members campaigned for it.
But, sure, you have to allow that. You can't overrule people's personal beliefs, even in a revolutionary organiisation. But the point about it is - the movement's open political position, for example on divorce, is that there should be divorce allowed in the 26 counties, there should be contraception in the 26 counties. In terms of ten years ago - in January 1974 on the front page of Republican News there was an article on the front page against contraaception, right? Front page article, England was trying to corrupt the morals of the Irish people, right? I mean, that has been a big change.
But what the Sinn Fein electoral intervention has done has been to create a network, an organisation, of ail these advice centres, of people who aren't sitting on the sidelines, It's not a question of if you can't join the IRA you're just an observer.
Getting involved in electoral politics necessitates explaining and arguing politics, things get more complicated, the old simplicities are not enough. Have these developments not created a gap between the leadership and its older rank and file, particularly in the South?
I think Sinn Fein in the South has undergone a lot of deveelopments as well. It's not just a paper-selling organisation and collecting for prisoners. It has started to get involved. Our successes are probably more marked in Dublin than in other places. But there has been an influx of new members, especially as a result of the European election, new cummain flourishing in different areas and that's good for the organiisation. Now, the social content of the organisation has not changed. Although there have been a lot of people coming in who don't directly come from republican families, who have never been in jail - I mean, I would be afraid that too much of an influx of that type of people would upset the balance inside the republican organisation. And you'd have people coming in who would perhaps be trendy, who wouldn't have had that long history of involvement that's actually the anchor of our stability and our consistency. And that might push things too quickly. The leadership can't get ahead of the grassroots. It has to bring the grasssroots along with it.
We face many problems in the 26 counties. The policy of abstentionism obviously handicaps our potential for gathering votes. But abstentionism has been a very imporrtant issue with the movement down the years. You don't change abstentionism as a result of all these new people coming in and getting a majority - that's why you can't allow people to come in and change the social content of the organisation. Any difficult issues which we face in the months and years ahead, we're going to have to resolve them on the basis of being completely united and with almost total agreement about how you go forward.
Isn't one major reason for the lack of development of Sinn Fein in the South its ambiguity towards the state, whether the state has to be removed?
Owen Carron was badly misquoted in a speech he made in London two years ago, about how republicans have to deestabilise the 26 counties. The Free State government has on occasion since then berated us over that statement, which Owen Carron did not make.
What Sinn Fein has to recognise and I think is recognising is that the vast majority of people in the 26 counties connsider the institutions of the state as being legitimate. Now, I don't. But it is not legitimate to attempt to bring down the 26 counties through armed struggle. Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, they're trying to change the 26 counties. Fianna Fail would argue for a unitary state. If there's a unitary state the 26 counties ceases to exist, the institutions of the state become new institutions. Fine Gael say they would favour a federal or confederal arrangement - in which case it has to be new institutions. What I'm saying is that in the course of achieving a united Ireland the 26 counties will naturally change. And it will have to at some stage cease to exist. Now, that's not the same as getting up waving a red flag and saying ''We're out to blow youse all away". The ordinary people in the 26 counties will remove the people who are presently in government and in opposition - beecause of their failures. They will have to go, they will be removed, quite naturally, by the people. It's got nothing to do with Sinn Fein, it's got nothing to do with the IRA.
Having said that 1 recognise that the vast majority of people in the 26 counties consider the state and its instituutions to be legitimate I still say that I don't consider it to be legitimate. I consider that the Free State was created by Britain and is still defending what was defended in the civil war, and Britain has dictated the political complexion of the 26 counties. It's a neo-colony. You've got them talkking, for instance, about National Wage Agreements - they're not national, they're 26 counties. The nation stops at Dundalk. You've this attempt to become insular and to try and create a nation out of 26 counties - which is a bigger contradiction than we face.
Sinn Fein faces massive problems in the 26 counties because obviously if the public considers the institutions of the state as being legitimate, and you're trying to appeal to the public surely you have to follow suit. And that's a big problem for us, because our republican tradition says that we can't follow suit - and I quite honestly don't know how we're going to overcome the problem, but Ijust know that as revolutionaries, as republicans, who have the respon sibility to plot a political way forward. I think that we will do it, but we'll do it by degrees.
To what extent is Sinn Fein embarrassed by the IRA's activities in the South - the kind of thing that the majoority of people disagree with, armed robberies and the like? The IRA, in doing things, has the potential to electorally hurt Sinn Fein. Having said that, the IRA has to do what the IRA has to do. For example, in the abduction of Don Tidey - which 'obviously arose because the IRA needed finances to wage struggle in the North, it was directly relaated to th-e struggle in the North. If Dublin governments were proving to the ordinary people in the Six Counties that there is a constitutional, or a pacifist, negotiable way out of this crisis - well then, surely they would be underrmining the IRA? But they don't do that. They ignore what's going on in the North, they are part of the problem, they have actually perpetuated the problem by collaboraating and giving the Brits hope that there can be a repressive method of killing this political crisis.
And so therefore, you have the nationalist people in the North, you have the IRA linked in to their interests and fighting for them - the IRA has to find funds somewhere and it's obvious that it's going to try and raise money in the 26 counties. It's obvious. Now, the way to get rid of the IRA is to solve the problem, not try and crack down on the IRA. Because the IRA is popular, it has support, and the Free State government needs to recognise that. Otherrwise they would have beaten the IRA twelve years ago. But the IRA continues to exist. Even if they introduced internment, even if they introduced capital punishment, even if they rounded up everybody, the problem still wouldn't go away. They have to face up to the problem Hand the problem is that in this country Britain claims that it has the right to occupy a certain amount of the territory on behalf of the national minority, the loyalists.
Now, it would be quite different if loyalist politicians were very, very broad-minded, decent people who wanted to share power, give us jobs, give us decent housing - as it is the loyalists are sectarian, almost racist - when you consider George Seawright, who was only speaking his mind, he's being an honest man. Britain is in here with guns, with finances, protecting the national minority, which is screwing and trying to make second-class citizens of us. And what does Dublin do about it? Dublin, which has a constitutional claim, a territorial claim over the North, Dublin which claims to be the inheritors of the 1916 men - it does nothing, except collaborate and perpetuate the problem ..
That is why you get the IRA, out of desperation, raising finances, using the methods that it does, in the 26 counties. And that is the tragedy of the situation. I would prefer that the IRA was handed money from somewhere else, that it didn't have to go out and carry out armed raids - it would certainly make life easier for Sinn Fein.
Sinn Fein sympathises with the difficulties that the IRA has, and that will always be our position. We're painted as extremists for saying that, but there's one thing about republicans - republicans speak their minds. Free state politicians won't speak their minds. They won't say, for example, that they don't want a united Ireland. They pretend that they want it. Why don't they get up and say "We don't want a united Ireland, right, because I don't want to lose my job, I don't want to lose my power and prestige." All rae parties in the 26 counties have a vested interest in the Free State continuing to exist forever.
The 'problem which the Dublin government has, which the SDLP has, is that they can't guarantee that their appproach is going to deliver an end to second-class citizenship and civil rights for the nationalists in the North. Because the achievement of civil rights is directly related to the achievement of national rights. The way to get our civil rights is to get our national rights, which means that Britain has to go, the loyalist veto has to be ended.
And the loyalists?
The people who are presently tied to loyalism can become whatever political power they want in a new Ireland, noobody wants to drive them out. We don't want civil war, we don't want to create a Protestant Republican Army, we've no interest in any of that.
There is no peaceful way of getting the Brits out of Ireeland. There is no constitutional way. We're told do it by the ballot box. Harold McCusker said in January of last year, whenever he was examining the demographics, the increassing numbers of Catholic school children at primary school level - don't worry if the Catholics get a majority in the six counties, we'll just re-partition.
Even if nationalists got into a majority in the six counties and tried to vote it into a united Ireland, we still wouldn't get a united Ireland. The loyalists would merely re-partition - they did it before; they were going for nine counties and went for six, they can go for three. And unnfortunately that's why the IRA exists. The IRA has to fight the Brits, has to wear down the will of the British to remain in Ireland, has to increase the cost of the British being in Ireland. And I have absolutely no doubt that they'll be successful in inflicting a political defeat - not a military defeat on the British army but a political defeat on the British government. The British will have examined everyything - internal settlements, assemblies, constitutional conventions, everything, until their last option - and it will be their last option, because the Brits will not examine it until that day. And that option will be British withdrawal and reunification.
Is it still seen within the republican movement as a long war, another twenty years?
There was some republican criticism that the 1978 declaraation of a long war actually led to some demoralisation and deterred people from joining the republican movement beecause they thought, "Gee, there's not going to be an ammnesty for Christmas, if I go to jail I'm not getting out for Christmas, I'm going in for a long time." That's possibly true. The point is, I think, that the IRA has to say what it believes, it has to tell the truth of how it sees things. The fact is that the Brits aren't going to get out tomorrow or next year. It's going to be a long struggle, and people who join the republican movement obviously are entitled to be acquainted with that belief. It's only fair on them. I would say, yes, still in terms of five to ten years. •