The Greening of Foreign Affairs

I JOINED FINE GAEL BECAUSE I DIDN'T WANT to beat the green tambourine," said the young Fine Gael activist. He was bewildered by the more strident nationalist tone which has marked government stateements on Northern Ireland over the last eighteen months. He was more than a little uneasy about the bank of red, or should one say, green buttons over which fingers seem to be poised inside the Department of Foreiga Affairs - really, in the event of any careless talk by a Northern Ireland secretary to send off a quick reactive missile, or as in the case of Douglas Hurd's RUC speech, a somewhat embarrassing pre-emptive strike.
Dancing a tattoo on the green tambourine has never been a Fine Gael forte. Though, history, they would claim, has given them every right to describe themselves as nationalist, they haven't cared for the divisive and even sectarian attitudes held by those who carry nationalism to extremes. John Bruton may have spoken for many Fine Gaelers when he once declared in an interview that he didn't "like beating the drum on Northern Ireland."

But the government, facing into a Thatcher summit this autumn, has hadsto act on the conclusions of its Forum deliiberations and indeed on the rationale which forced the setting up of the Forum in the first place - that the drift away from constitutional politics by Northern nationalists had to be halted.

The result, government policymakers privately admit, has been a determination to parade as publicly as possible Dublin's role as protectors of the nationaalist community, to cry foul when Northern nationaalist sensitivities are offended. This is to be done even at the risk of sacrificing the trust of those moderate unionists, a trust Garret FitzGerald took some trouble to develop and which he prizes greatly. It is also to be done at the risk of wearing out FitzzGerald's welcome from the British.

The factor which persuaded FItzGerald to go up what his advisors admit is a side road to his general approach, Was a reluctant acceptance of the evid;nce presented to him by the SDLP and John Hume - evidence of a growing alienaation among Northern Catholics, a hopelessness about proogress from constitutional quarters, and an increased tolerrance of, if not support for, the activities of the Provisional IRA. There were increasing sectarian clashes on Belfast, Enniskillen and Derry councils. Northern Catholics were beginning to suggest that Dublin should cut down on secuurity co-operation, to ask why it should do Britain's dirty work.

The government's own scouts in the North were reporting the same draft, and indeed the subsequent Westminster elections were to confirm it.

It was decided that the Irish government would have to set itself up as the lifesblood of Northern nationalism and that this would have to be acknowledged by Britain. If the SDLP were to disappear, and the government were being realistic about the long-term there was a danger that the British would deal with the Provisionals as representatives of the minority. The Irish government had to avoid that happenning by establishing its right to speak on the minority's behalf.

The new mantle of nationalism sat ill on the shoulders of Garret FitzGerald, the man who liked to feel he had a' welcome from both communities in Northern Ireland, who didn't like the hand of Dublin toElie to.o heavily on the shoulders of Northern nationalists and their leaders. But Peter Barry was a more plausible nationalist watchdog.

Barry, as the SDLP discovered over the years, has a passionate and vigorously expressed loyalty to Northern Catholics. It emerged sharply during one closed session of the Forum .Tohn Kelly was arguing that acertaindocumetit ignored the sensitivities of Northern unionists and Barry retorted that he "wasn't going to sell Northern nationalists down the river."

But perhaps his most forthright presentation of his views came on March 9 1983, after agreement to set up the Forum, itself a direct response to John Hume's appeal for a shot in the arm for the SDLP and for constitutional nationalism, and one for which Fitzgerald, Barry and Michael Noonan were the only cabinet members to show such enthusiasm. Ina a speech in Limerick, Peter Barry said "I am an Irish nationalist. I resent th political division of this island and I regard the long-term British presence in Ireland as an obstacle to the reconciliation of the two Irish traditions and to the achievement of stability on the island.... As long as the British support one side in that conflict, we cannot hope for a normal relationship between the peoples of these two islands.
Current British policy is in fact determined by one million unionists. Is it unreasonable to ask that British policy should reflect the news of the majority of the people of the ulster kingdom?

"How long more, will one million people be allowed to impede not only the reconciliation of five million people on this island but the development of normal relations between the fifty-eight millions who live-on both these islands."

IN SUBSEQUENT SPEECHES BY BOTH PETER Barry himself, and Michael Noonan, the withdrawal card was played down but the more aggressive nationalist note, the demand for a British gesture towards long-suffering Northern nationalists was repeated. The Irish governnment's determination to end the Northern minority's nightmare was reiterated.

The government also decided to be the voice through which Northern nationalists made their specific protests to the British government. The visit by the Duke of Edinburgh to Dromad Barracks, where eightmembers of the UDR had been charged with sectarian murder, led the Irish government to protest at ministerial and official levels: Peter Barry protested at the congratulations extennded by Judge Gibson to the RUC in June this year when, at the trial for the murder of three IRA men, he said the RUC had brought "the three deceased men to justice, in this case to the final courts of justice." Did this justify a "shoot to kill policy", he wanted to know.

The RUC attack on a Sinn Fein rally addressed by Noraid organiser Martin Galvin in August, in which 22-year-old Sean Downes Was killed, resulted in a direct protest by phone to the Northern Ireland Secretary from Peter Barry. Prior subsequently admitted publicly that mistakes had been made.

The comments only this month by the new Northern Secretary, Douglas Hurd, that there was increasing support for the RUC evinced a hasty protest from the Department of Foreign Affairs based on an incomplete reading of Hurd's speech. Iveagh House accept that in this instance an amount of egg was left on Irish diplomatic faces, but they, and Peter Barry, could have comfortably done without the Taoiseach's public beating of his breast on the matter, when he admitted on radio the protest had been a bit hasty.

The incident did point up the dangers of the finger on the button tactic, but then government policymakers accept they are on a dangerous road.

There is the danger that by espousing the cause of the nationalists they are driving a barrier between the two commmunities, but by steering a middle course, they were afraid of losing contact with nationalists totally.

"It's a side road for a year or eighteen months or so to pick up a problem," said a government source. "Once we've dealt with the repairs we'll be back on the main road again."

It's a very tricky exercise, they admit, it may not work.

But then the Forum was a gamble too. It may not work.

They feel the British Foreign Office understand their dilemma and are doing their best to co-operate - the Douglas Hurd speech was a Northern Ireland Office producction, the Foreign Office would not have passed the section about increased support for the RUC.

In their new role as nationalist policemen, Dublin know that occasionally the British will tell them to get stuffed, occasionally their quick reaction force will get it wrong. "But if you are in a fastball game and you don't want to lose the next editions of the papers," said one aide, "you have to take a chance."

It's a measure of Fine Gael's policy shift, and of inncreasing polarisation in the North that it now finds itself so at odds policy-wise with the Alliance party, even if there is still considerable admiration for Alliance within Fine Gael. Many members of the party and some of the cabinet would feel more naturally at home with Alliance. John Kelly said this month that he certainly would. It was partly Fine Gael's regret at the differences which have developed over the Assembly and the Forum which led them to give such a warm welcome to Alliance's new leader, John Cushnahan at the recent Ard Fheis.

The regret is shared by Cushnahan who has great persoonal respect for Garret FitzGerald. "Although the general approach of the coalition is, I believe, constructive, I'm surprised at recent developments. The difference of emphaasis in recent statements is to be regretted. In particular, I fmd it inconsistent for the coalition to state that they believe in a pluralistic approach, but at the same time, they are talking about being the negotiator on behalf of the minority in Northern Ireland. Such a statement of position represents a partisan role on Northern Ireland rather than a pluralistic one.

"I also have been somewhat surprised at the unrealistic lations that have been aroused about the outcome of forthcoming summit between Mrs Thatcher and Dr Fitzgerald. These represent a yardstick by which progress red, Because of this they may rebound on the government and the SDLP in the North if a measire of progress is made which is regarded as falling short of what was expected."

The government has spoken optimistically about its hopes for the summit, but in truth there's a certain amount of whistling in the dark. The British are being briefed on the Forum report, chapter by chapter, a process that has so far taken five months and according to officials is the most intense pre-negotiation period since the lead-up to Sunningdale.

So far British goodwill has been maintained, at no time more determinedly than after the Brighton bombings. But what can Britain offer?

What the Irish government want is obviously some statutory recognition of ns- role as Northern nationalist guarantor.

It is some formal recognition of this right that is the Irish government's minimal expectation, and the focus of present policy. In the meantime, the government will mainntain its role as the voice of Northern nationalism with a particular view to next year's local elections. The general apprehension is that Provisional Sinn Fein's well-funded local constituency work will payoff on the ground.

It's the provisional IRA, indeed, and his fear of them, which has forced FitzGerald down greener and greener paths. Will he fmd his way back? •