Labour Party Special Report
Part I: Labour before and after Frank Cluskey
FOR BOTH COALITION parties the experience in Government and the election were calamities and, although Fine Gael iost more seats and more votes; the outcome for Labour is the more serious. By: Vincent Browne
In the first place the party is back to its electoral position of 1961, but worse than that since 1969 it has lost a third of its vote. The Coalition experiment has again proved a disaster for Labour.
Though Fine Gael has also reverted to its 1961 electoral position there are signs of vigour within the party under the leadership of Garret FitzzGerald and for the first time, virtually since the 1930's, the party has a vision of what it is about and where it is going.
In contrast, Labour enjoys no such advantages. The leadership is now as moribund as at any time since the days of William Norton. Having flirted with socialism in the late 'sixties and then abandoned itfor right wing social detnocracy in the 'seventies) the party is more perplexed now about its political role than at any time since the previous coalition.
In addition, the party has consoliidated its traditional deficiencies deep ambiguity on the national quesstion coupled with a failure to attract in large numbers the urban working' class. It threatens to return to the poltroonery for which Conor Cruise O'Brien derided it in the early 'sixties - a vehicle for an assortment of independents, allied to a trade union rump.
As Labour leaders tirelessly repeat to no apparent purpose, the Labour Party is the oldest politicai party in Ireland, but also the least successful of the three major parties.
It has been in existence since 1912, it has never won tnore than 16.9% of the vote and that was in 1969 at an election
which was regarded by the heady leaderrship of the day as a disaster and called for a dramatic shift of policy. It won its greatest number of seats in 1965 but that was almost entirely at the expense of Independents who had come into the Dail following the collapse of the seecond Coalition. It also shares the disstinction of being the weakest social democratic party in Europe for reasons endemic to Ireland, reasons which have never been fully appreciated by the Labour leadership, least of all now.
Of its 19 TDs in the current Dail, at least five (Michael Pat Murphy, Seamus Pattison, John Ryan, Dan Spring and Sean Tracey) have only the most tanngential relationship with the party in ideological terms. If anyone of them were to retire it is' virtually certain that the party would lose the seat.
Of the other 13, only about 7 could be described even in the broadest sense a socialist (Frank Cluskey , . BrendaH Corish, Barry Desmond, John Horgan, John O'Connell, Michael O'Leary and Ruairi Quinn) and even then serious question marks arise in all their cases, especially in the instance of Ruairi Quinn. (His budget speech is analysed later in this feature and he voted in favour of the emergency powers legisslation package in the Senate in Septemmber 1976 when there was no real commpulsion on him to do so.)
The left wing faction within the party has drifted or been pushed into the Socialist Labour Party and the only radical section remaining, that assoociated with The Militant, is almost reactionary on the national question, and derivitative (of the British Tribune group) on economic issues.
The. founder of the Labour Party was James Larkin, assisted by James Connnolly and William O'Brien. The party grew out of the youthful Irish Transport and General Workers Union, also funnded by Larkin and the newly formed Irish TUC which had been won over by Connolly and O'Brien.
From its inception' the party' was rent-by diletnmas. It was an exclusively trade unionist party initially and it assiduously avoided any position on the national question so as not to .. alienate loyalist trade unionists in tHe North.
The Labour Party took no official part in the 1916 Rising, although James Connolly was one of its leaded. Larkin was in America at the time of the Rising and his place as leader had been taken by Connolly, but the latter's involveement in the Rebellion was strictly unnofficial.
Connolly was succeeded' as, lehder by Thomas Johnson, an English born sociaalist who steered the party further away from the national issue to concentrate on social and econbmic questiofis. This made the party partly irrelevant in the era of Sinn Fein upsurge. This was best reflected in the "party, executive's deciision not to contest the 1918 election against Sinn Fein - its own memberrship would not have tolerated it.
The party played no role in the war of independence, no part in the Treaty negotiations, while thousands of radical youths throughout the country flocked to the republican cause, which then was synonymous with the anti-imperialist struggle.
In the first post- Treaty elections, the party won 18 seats in the new Dail and among those elected were Thomas Johnnson, T.J. O'Connell (later to serve brieffly as leader), James Everrett (later to become a Mirtister in Coalition Governnments), Dan Morrissey (later to join Fine Gael) and Richard Corish (father of Brendan).
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LABOUR PARTY SPECIAL REPORT - No lessons learnt
Tags: Labour, Irish Politics, Jim Larkin, ITGWU
By: Vincent Browne
The Labour Party entered the Second Dail and thereby, although its members took no part in the civil war, they joined the Free State side in the conflict.
From early on in the - 'twenties Labour underwent the first of a series of recurrent internal disputes which . were to further sabotage its chances of attracting the working class vote. This was the fued between Jim Larkin and William O'Brien for control of the ITGWU - the former taking a gradualist posture and the latter a revolutionary one. The dispute erupted when Larkin returned from America. He was evenntually expelled from the ITGWU and effectively from the Labour Party. He stood as a Communist candidate against Labour in the 1927 election and beecame a vehement critic of the party.
Labour got its first glimpses at the prospect of power in 1927, first when De Valera agreed to support a coalition government of Labour and the National League (a farmers' party) - this move failed on the casting vote of the Ceann Comhairle and Cumann na nGaedheal stayed in office though a minority party.
Its second glimpse of power occurred following the assassination of Kevin O'Higgins in July 1927. Labour offered to join with Cum ann na nGaedheal in a coalition government on the day after _ the assassination but, 'after brief consideration, W. 'T. Cosgrave turned down the offer. Labour was to wait more than 20 years before seeing the prospect of office again and it was to suffer an immmediate reversal at the polls.
In the second election of 1927, Labour fared disastrously. In the June election it had won 12.6% of the vote and 22 seats but in the September election its vote fell to 9.9% and it won only 13 seats.
Among the casualties in that election was Thomas Johnson, who was reeplaced as leader of the party by a cautious official of the Irish National Teachers' Organisation (INTO), T. J. O'Connell. The party was placed at a further disadvantage by the entry of Fianna Fail to the Dail. De Valera's party postulated a radical economic and social policy as well as being radical on the national and constitutional issues - there was little room for a timid Labour Party.
That disadvantage was underlined by the party's drop of a further two perrcentage points in the 1932 election and the loss of 6 more seats - if won only 7 seats in that election, the lowest in its history. The obvious conclusions to be drawn from that result were never heeded by the party. They were that its "softness" on the national question was a severe handicap and its identiification problems on economic and social issues was a further disadvantage. The party faces almost exactly similar dilemmas today - it is at best ambiiguous on the unity issue and almost indecipherable from Fine Gael on social and economic policies.
T.J. O'Connell lost his seat in the '32 election and William Norton, secreetary of the Post Office Workers' Union, was elected as leader in his place. He was to retain the leadership for 28 years.
It wasn't only Fianna Fail that Labour had to worry about in those years. The IRA siphoned off most of the best militant socialists at the time, even though it split and split again in that decade. Labour at first co-operated with Fianna Fail in Government - it helped, along with James Dillon, to elect De Valera Taoiseach in the first instance. But it was the unreliability of Labour's continued support that prompted. De Valera to go to the polls again in 1933. The result of that elecction was that now Fianna Fail could govern on its own, while Labour won one extra seat but dropped its share of the vote to 5.7%, another lowest in its history. Whatever power it enjoyed as the kingmaker was now gone and henceforth it had to compete on very unequal terms with Fianna Fail for the working class and small farmer vote.
In the mid 'thirties the party adopted a radical programme in an effort to establish a separate militant identity. It declared its goal as a "Workers Repubblic" and called for the nationalisation of all basic industries. For its pains it got roundly denounced by the Catholic hierarchy.
In the early 'forties there were signs of a Labour revival as the electorate began to tire of Fianna Fail. Larkin reejoined the party and in the 1943 elecction it won 16% of the vote and 17 seats. But the old fued which had only barely subsided - that between Larkin and O'Brien - surfaced again and gravely damaged the party. It was partly for this reason that Labour vote dropped to 11.5% in the 1944 election and they lost 5 seats.
The basis of the new dispute was the refusal of the Administrative Council, controlled by the ITGWU, to ratify Larkin's candidature for the 1943 elecction. This was defied by the Dublin Executive of the party and Norton and it led to the disaffiliation of the ITGWU from the Labour Party and the estabblishment of National Labour.
With the death of Larkin and the retirement of O'Brien much of the personal bitterness subsided, although the ITGWU had behaved disgracefully, allying itself with reactionary Catholic elements in raising the red scare. But the party had to face a new and formidable competitor for the radical constituency. This was Clann na Poblachta, which like Fianna Fail in the late 'twenties and early 'thirties espoused economic and social radicalism allied to militant reepublicanism.
However it was Labour which fared the better in the 1948 election, at least in terms of seats. It won 19 seats. Clann, because of the vagaries of the electoral system, won just 10 seats with 25,000 more votes.
Both Labour factions agreed to join the anti-Fianna Fail coalition. Norton became Tanaiste and Minister for Social Welfare, Timothy Murphy beecame Minister for Local Government and James Everett of National Labour became Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, a favourite Labour Ministry (they have filled the post in all three coalition governments). Both Labour and Fine Gael profitted in terms of votes from that first coalition - Clann were the losers - and thus it was natural to resume the coalition arrangeement after the 1955 election when Labour again won 19 seats and 12.1 % of the vote.
The second Coalition proved calamiitous for Labour however, partly because its identity was subsumed almost enntirely with that of Fine Gael. After the collapse of that Government the Labour vote plummetted to 9.1% - its lowest level since 1933 - and it ended up again with just 12 seats.
In 1960 William Norton ceded the leadership r to Brendan Corish who had been Minister for Social Welfare in the second Coalition. Corish was alarmed by the electoral consequences of the Coalition involvement and thus his "go it alone" posture in the 1961, '65 and '69 elections were very much his own doing.
Labour won 22 seats in the '65'elecction and 15.4% of the vote. This encouuraged an unfounded euphoria which left expectations of 40 seats-plus for the '69 election which was fought on the "Socialist Republic" programme. The disappointment of those unwarranted expectations disguised the considerable advance the party had made in electoral terms.
Though it ended up with only 18 seats it won its highest percentage vote ever, 16.9%. But, the careerist element that had entered the party in the post '65 period were impatient to get their hands on the levers of power, thus from the night of the '69 election results coalition was always an inevitability and on the worst possible terms.
The consequences of that impatience are evident from the experience in Government, and the legacy which that has left the Labour Party is what Frank Cluskey has now to deal with. Judging I by the leadership mortality of his two' predecessors, Cluskey could expect to I be leader for about 24 years - Until/ 2001 AD, but the omens are not enncouraging for him.
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LABOUR PARTY SPECIAL REPORT - How Cluskey was elected
Tags: Frank Cluskey, Labour, Flor O'Mahony
By: Vincent Browne
THE CIRCUMSTANCES of Cluskey's election as leader were none too reeassuring. It was generally anticipated that Brendan Corish would stand down within a few months, probably after the party conference, then expected in November. This impression appears to have been conveyed obliquely to the Admisistrative Council. However within days of Liam Cosgrave's announcement of his intention to resign as leader of Fine Gael, Corish declared that he was doing likewise ..
The official party line is that he discussed his intention with nobody but it is unlikely that he did not talk about it with Halligan and, although Cluskey denies he had any prior knowwledge of it, it is also unlikely that he had not some inkling of what was going on.
Certainly Corish went at the time best suited to Cluskey's interests. Had the decision been deferred for some months, the then Ceann Comhairle, Sean Tracey, would have rejoined the Parliamentary Party and there was a possibility that Mick Lipper of Limerick and maybe even Noel Browne) would have been eligible to vote also. Nobody knew how they would vote in a leaderrship election and certainly there was no reason to presume on their loyalty to an establishment-sponsored candidate.
By holding the election on the occcasion of the first meeting of the Parliaamentary Party, the uncertainty about Tracey was eliminated - he was unable to take part by virtue of being Ceann Comhairle and there was no question of Browne or Lipper being involved.
The Cluskey camp were cock-sure of victory. Halligan, indefatigable as always in party in-fighting, was the campaign manager, assisted by Barry Desmond and Flor O'Mahony, the official who had run Labour's part of the general election campaign, if it can be described as such.
They telephoned every deputy eligible to vote and were assured that O'Leary who had emerged - to their surprise pas the challenger would gain no more than two or three votes. Indeed at one stage they wondered who would second his nomination.
O'Leary first heard of Corish's intenntion to resign some minutes after Corish had given a press conference in Wexford at which he made the announcement. It was Corish himself who called him.
O'Leary had the backing of none of the party establishment and given the short notice he received, it is remarkable that he did so well. He was prominently supported by Tully and Kavanagh.
Nobody within the Labour Party addmits to knowing how all the 16 TDs voted but the following breakdown is based on several interviews with key people in the two campaigns.
Cluskey: O'Leary:
B. Corish J.Tully
B. Desmond M. P. Murphy
J. Horgan P. Kerrigan
R. Quinn S. Pattison
J. Birmingham L. Kavanagh
E. Desmond L. O'Connell
J. Ryan D. Spring
When the tie vote was announced by Parliamentary Party chairman, Joe Birmingham, there was a proposal that the meeting be adjourned for a week to permit further consideration of the matter by the deputies, and connsultation with their respective constiituency workers.
The adjournment call was dismissed and the 16 TDs ballotted again. The reesult this time was 9 votes to 7 in favour of Cluskey - one TD had changed his vote. Predictably, there has been intense speculation within the party since then on the identity of the TD who switched. John O'Connell's and Liam Kavanagh's names are the ones most often mentionned. Both deny the charge and really noobody but the person himself knows for sure.
Corish's support for Cluskey was a significan t element in the latter's elecction and the reasons for it are curious. After all Corish had taken O'Leary into the Coalition cabinet in 1973 in preeference to Cluskey , and throughout both the exciting and' dreary days in opposition O'Leary had been one of Corish's right hand men.
Corish tended to rely quite a lot on those immediately around him and though O'Leary was clearly the decisive influence around 1966 and '67, after Proinsias MacAonghusa and his wife, Catherine McGuinness, had departed, he was replaced as Corish's Haldemann bY Halligan after the latter had become securely installed as party secretary.
Ironically, it was partly through O'Leary's auspices that Halligan got the job in 1967. O'Leary was on the interrview panel for the general secretaryship and voted for Halligan.
It was Halligan who made all the runnning with Corish in those heady days in 1968 and ' 69 when Labour was certain that it was to become the second largest party after the 'next election and' the government in the election after that. Halligan pushed Corish into rhetorical extravagances, notably his commitment to retire to the backbenches should the party ever decide to join a coalition.
Once the 1969 results were in it was Halligan who decided that the rigid "no coalition" stance would have to be ameliorated irrespective of the credibility problems that this would cause Corisb. - but Halligan has always been notoriously insensitive on the credibility question.
Halligan was the key figure in the tentative negotiations that went on with the FitzGerald wing of Fine Gael from 1970 to '1973 and he, almost as much as Conor Cruise O'Brien, was responsible for driving the party into a frenzy on the Northern Ireland question once the Provo campaign began.
He seriously believed that a coup d'etat was on in 1970 during the arms crisis and during the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Bill debate in the Dail when the bombs went off near O'Connell Street. It was Halligan who panicked and tried to persuade the parliamentary party to drop its opposition to the Bill. Throughout all this Halligan retained the confidence of Corish and he was the hatchet man who chopped down any opposition within the party to the pro-coalition line which emerged in the post 1969 period.
When the nitty gritty of the joint election between Labour and Fine Gael came to be negotiated in February 1973 again it was Halligan who was Labour's key figure, and when the ministries were doled out it was Halligan who guided Corish's hand in determining who should be the Labour ministers and where they should be placed.
O'Leary had always said that Labour should never accept the Labour porttfolio so it was hardly paranoia on his part when he suspected Halligan of mischievousness when that was the very portfolio he was offered. Incidenntally Halligan advised Brendan Corish against accepting the Department of Finance, although Labour theoreticians had always argued that a pre-condition of their joining another coalition was that they would have their hands on the purse strings. It is only fair to record, however, that Corish himself didn't want the job and the offer was open to no other member of the party.
Inevitably in Government Corish came under other influences. First there were his Departmental officials, then Flor O'Mahony whom he had brought in as his adviser on health and then Frank Cluskey , his parliamentary secretary, to whom he had bequeathed the Social Welfare portfolio.
Cluskey's performance in Social Welfare impressed Corish, not just because he was a reasonably competent parliamentary secretary, but more immportant because in Government he overcame his drink problem, which had cost him a place in the cabinet in the first place. But Cluskey didn't emerge as the successor to Corish until another leading contender had virtually dissqualified himself. This was Justin Keating who was the establishment's favoured son until he succumbed in Industry and Commerce. Keating was a disappointment as a minister, certainly in terms of the high expectations that had been held out for him. Fairly early on he decided that he wanted to be the next EEC commissioner and spent much of his time canvassing for that job, cerrtainly he was distracted from domestic matters. He needlessly antagonised several Fine Gael members in the cabiinet by his scarcely concealed villificaation of Dick Burke, his only competitor for the job, and failed to get the nod from Cosgrave, although he courted him assiduously.
Keating had also alienated himself from backbench Labour TDs. He outtraged such as Eileen Desmond and John Ryan by his dismissive attitude to deleegations they led from their constituenncies. It was clear that Keating wouldn't make it as .leader in spite of all the support of the establishment. Then, of course, he lost his seat in the election and that was that.
Cluskey had entered the reckoning as early as 1975. Stevie Coughlan did a straw poll of Labour TDs and disscovered that he was the overwhelming choice. It was hardly surprising. Cluskey was in the bounty portfolio and the Coalition did make considerable strides in this area in the first few years. He also had the advantage of being accesssible. The portfolio was none too onerous and he didn't have the chore of attending interminable coffee L' cup clinking cabinet meetings. He' was around Leinster House for casual chats with backbenchers and his amenable manner won him many friends.
There is traditionally a hugh corresspondence into the Department of Social Welfare. Cluskey took assiduous care of this and won strong support in the constituencies as a result - Charlie Haughey is making similar strides nowadays for the same reason.
At a private party in Stevie Coughhlan's house during the 1976 Labour Conference, Corish, stimulated by the hospitality,. is reported to have encouuraged all those present to vote for Cluskey when he retired. Cluskey was the heir apparent.
In view of the support Cluskey had going for him and the advantage of having spent four years in the most popular Department, it was surprising that he didn't win the leadership contest comfortably. But then he was never an impressive vote-getter.
In 1965, in his first election, he was the only Labour candidate in Dublin South Central and came second in the poll to Sean Lemass. He won 7,098 votes, comfortably ahead of the quota by over 1,000 votes on the first count. He took the seat formerly held by Clann na Poblachta's Joe Barron.
In the 1969 election he stood in the Dublin Central constituency and this time he had two Labour running mates. He won 5413 votes and the Labour percentage of the poll in the constiiuency was 291170.
In 1973, standing again in Dublin Central, he won 3,864 votes, while the Labour percentage in the constituency was 23.-89%. In 1977 he again stood alone, this time in the new Dublin South Central constituency. He won a relatively poor 3,986 votes with a perrcentage of the total of 16.94%.
It was on his insistence that he stood alone in 1977 and he seemed in danger of losing his seat for a while. Finally he was elected on the fifth count, thanks to huge transfers from Andy Smith of Official Sinn Fein and Alexis FitzGerald of Fine Gael. The latter's 2,280 transsfers to Cluskey contained hardly any hard core working class votes. The record at the polls doesn't suggest massive voting appeal.
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LABOUR PARTY SPECIAL REPORT - How Frank Cluskey has failed
Tags: Frank Cluskey, Labour, Flor O'Mahony, Conor Cruise O'Brien, Garret Fitzgerald, Fine Gael
By: Vincent Browne
Cluskey was probably unfortunate in coming to the leadership of Labour at the same time as Garret FitzGerald became leader of Fine Gael. Inevitably comparisons were made amd they were, and are, none too favourable to the Labour leader. Cluskey simply doesn't possess the intellect, dynamism and charisma of FitzGerald. And, perhaps more importantly in the long term, he is no match for the Fine Gael leader on television.
While Garret toured the constituencies in a blaze of publicity and public acclaim, Cluskey followed on unnoticed to constituency organisations throughhout the country. It was typical of the "new" Labour party that the exercise should have been conducted in such semi secrecy. While FitzGerald was inviting reporters to attend even the private meetings he had with constiituency executives, Cluskey was excludding reporters from the general party meetings.
Labour is nowadays obsessed with secrecy, largely asa reaction to the deebilitating internal rows the party sufffered in the last year, and which cost them at least three seats in the general election - Cabra, Finglas and Artane. There is little discussion about party matters even internally in the party, there is little gossip and little camaraaderie." Typical of the new leadership was the decision to hold the Youth Connfererrce last month in secret. Even so the constituency tour has not been without value. The meetings have been candid and blunt. The anti-coalition feeling has revived with a vengence, somewhat to the embarrassment of the leadership, one suspects. There has been quite a lot of criticism of the perforrmance of the party in Government with the repeated comment that they should have "pulled out" a year or so before the election took place. Incidentally, inntimates of Corish insist that it was his intention to break the coalition within two years of re-election in '77. However there are few indications that he would have gone through with it when the crunch came.
There has been favourable mention of Tully, O'Leary and Cluskey himself in Government but severe criticism of Conor Cruise O'Brien and Corish. Of the Fine Gael ministers, Paddy Cooney has been making a point of concurring with this criticism of his former collleague and one time Minister for Justice.
At the meeting in the Clontarf constituency in mid March, the resident Oireachtas member, Conor Cruise O'Brien, was absent although he had got very adequate notice of this the most important meeting in his connstituency since the election. Rather surprisingly there wasn't even a mention of his name at this meeting.
Brendan Halligan has also come in for a lot of adverse comment. Several party members have attributed to him much of the blame for the election debacle and at his own Finglas constiituency meeting he was severely castiigated for his antics both there and in Dublin South East during the year prior to the election. Halligan was absent from this meeting as he was attending the funeral of his father.
Justin Keating has hardly been menntioned at these gatherings and when his name has cropped up there has been almost an equal division of opinion on the merits of his contribution to the last Government. It has been clear from conntacts with the constituency organisaations in both Clontarf and Dublin West County that a critical factor in the defeats of both Keating and O'Brien was their neglect of their respective constituencies during their period in office.
Another major issue to emerge from the constituency meetings has been the inadequacy of the coalition's jobbery campaign. After 16 years in the wilderness it appears several Labour stalwarts believed it was time they enjoyed some of the fruits of power and were disappointed with the relatively restrained policy of the Coalition on this score.
Contraception has come up a lot as a major issue in the Dublin constituenncies, though hardly in the rural areas. Assistant general secretary, Seamus Scally, and for part of the tour, national organiser Senator Jack Harte, accommpanied Cluskey in the constituency round.
Scally's presence at these functions raises the question of what Halligan is doing for the £7,400 he gets as general secretary. There has been considerable resentment within the party at all levels at his presumption in returning to the general secretaryship following his Dail defeat and his failure to secure a nomiination for the Senate. True, this was in accordance with an extraordinary arrangement he had made with the Admisistrative Council in June '76 prior to the Dublin South West by-election. This was that he would take leave of absence to fight the election, if elected he would continue to take leave of abbsence until the general election and then if elected again he would resign the posiition. However, if he were to lose either the by-election or the general election he would have the option of returning to his former position as general seccretary. Meanwhile Seamus Scally was to become acting general secretary.
Few believed that Halligan would exercise his option to return after his Dail defeat, especially in the light of the flagrantly broken promise he made to the electorate of Dublin South West in the by-election, when he declared that he would contest a seat in that same constituency if he was elected.
He descended into a cloud of gloom immediately after the election and connsidered for a while opting out of poliitics. However, he has now not only reestored himself to his former position as general secretary at the expense of Seamus Scally, but has ingratiated himmself into the closest confidences of the new leader. Halligan is again calling the shots.
But apart from that it is not clear just what he does do. Certainly most of the organisational work, which is the primary duty of a general secretary, is currently being done almost exclusively by Seamus Scally, while Halligan shuttles between a building firm in which he has become a director, a colllege where he is lecturing two days a week and the Dail where he instructs Cluskey on what to do with the party.
The others close to Cluskey at present are Flor O'Mahony, Tony Browne and Donal Nevin. O'Mahony is probably the ablest in the Labour Party backrooms. He was one of the pre '69 recruits, he fought the election that year in DunLaoghaire and was narrowly beaten by Barry Desmond. When Corish became Tanaiste he brought O'Mahony into the Department of Health as poliitical adviser and during the '77 election campaign he was almost the only one on either the Fine Gael or Labour side to attempt to bring some semblance of organisation into the campaign - it was he for instance who came up with the novel idea that a campaign committee should be set up a week after the elecction campaign had begun!
Donal Nevin, of the ICTU, is an old friend of Cluskey and, reportedly, he has great influence with the new leader. Tony Browne, an economist with the Sugar Company, was Cluskey's addviser at the Department of Social Wellfare. He is now European Affairs officer in the party and it is he, appparently who arranges all the trips for the party officialdom.. He himself has been to Brussels, Hamburg, Luxemburg, Strasburg, Madrid and Amsterdam since July. Cluskey has done even better. He has been to ,J apan, Hamburg (twice), Strasburg, Madrid and London.
Others who have been on trips since the election have been Joe Birmingham and John O'Connell to Strasburg (the first trip he was on as a member of a Labour delegation since he entered the Dail in 1965), Dan Browne and Michael O'Leary to Madrid, Ruairi Quinn to the British Labour Party Conference and Flor O'Mahony to Hamburg.
Most of the fares for these trips have been paid by the Socialist International or the European Parliament, but in spite of party officials' claims that these are vital conferences, they have been, in the main, frivolous affair's. The vying withhin the party for places on these trips has been not entirely edifying.
Other issues of comparable moment have also been pre-occupying the party. At an apocryphal meeting of the Addministrative Council recently there was a protracted debate on whether the party's letterhead should be changed from blue to red, and likewise the decor at the party conference. After much debate it was finally decided that it should be red.
Then a discussion arose on whether the leader's portrait should be centre stage or off centre. At this juncture Halligan intervened with characterisstic decisiveness and declared that the leader's picture would have to be cenntre stage so as to penetrate into every home in the country.
But it is in the area of policy that most problems face the Labour Party. Not at any stage in its history has the party had a clear idea of where it is gooing, and what it is supposed to be. Now and again, such as at present, the party is pleased to describe itself as "sociallist", but invariably it goes on to qualify the word almost out of existence.
The problem of identity is particuularly acute now for two reasons. First there is a credibility problem. How can a party that so recently gave such wholeehearted support to so clearly nonialist policies in Government, now mainntain that it is socialist. And, on the other side of the coin, how can the parrty clearly differentiate itself from Fine Gael under Garret FitzGerald when he is articulating such social democratic sentiments as to be almost indistinguishable from the basic instinctive poliicies of most Labour leaders. Working groups within the party have been draftting policy statements for presentation to conference. The most crucial of these is the one on "the socialist dimension" where the party, for the first time, at least in living memory. has attempted to define what it is about and what socialism means to it.
The main draft work has been done by Flor O'Mahony, assisted by John Horgan and Pat Carroll. While the text of this document is not available to us at the time of writing, it is clear that while quite radical scenarios are proojected for the long term, socialism is seen very much within the social deemocratic model: greater redistribution of wealth through social welfare beneefits, etc, more democratic control over major industrial and commercial ennterprises and a greater degree of parrticipatory democracy.
Great recognition is given to the fact that the Labour Party commands less than 12% of the vote and, thereefore, cannot hope to achieve its ultimate objective of full socialism.
Other policy committees have been drafting policies on economic affairs, health and the environment. Halligan has been the main architect of ecconomic policy, O'Mahony has drafted the health policy and Ruairi Quinn has been the author of the environment policy. Constituency parties have contributed substantially to all poolicies and their contributions are being published separately.
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LABOUR PARTY SPECIAL REPORT - Labour - does it know where it's going?
An analysis of speeches by Labour leaders reveals great confusion both on policy and strategy
Tags: Labour, Ruari Quinn, John Horgan, Michael O'Keary, Frank Cluskey, Conor Cruise O'Brien
By: Vincent Browne
FRANK CLUSKEY has delivered a number of major speeches on policy and the future of the Labour Party. The following are key extracts form the most important speeches/statements, followed by a commentary on their significance. We also extract and commment' on statements made by Michael O'Leary, John Horgan and Ruairi Quinn.
On the day of his election as leader on 1 July 1977 he said in a statement,
"We are at a remarkable and excitting time in Irish political life. There is reason now to believe that the Irish electorate has br-oken, for the first time, with the inherited trends of the past. The opportunity now exists for the development of politics based on policies for the future rather than on slogans derived from the past. The oppportunity must be grasped."
Commentary: Ignoring platitudinous currency of tired politics ("the oppportunity must be grasped," etc) the passage is noteworthy for its obdurate euphoria just two weeks after a humiiliating election defeat. One might have expected a socialist party to ponder on the mistakes of coalition, examine what went wrong, and why, analyse if any ad· vances had been made towards a sociallist objective, and wonder if any such progress can be made through coalition. This statement effectively blocked any such exercise, and in the interim, there has been no attempt within the Labour Party to enquire into what went wrong, thereby ensuring that almost certainly the same mistakes will be repeated.
In Macroom on 9 September last he said:
"Remember what has been done by Labour in Government in the area of capital taxation, housing, social welfare, health, labour legislation, control of our natural resources and social reform. These are examples of what can be brought about by Labour in Governnment."
Commentary: Again inexplicable euuphoria in the light of the general elecction result. Arguably Labour achieved almost nothing in Government and cerrtainly Cluskey has admitted (in an interview with this reporter in the Sunday Independent) that there was almost no progress made towards creating a sociallist society during the period of office of the Coalition Government. This kind of rhetoric serves only to confuse any real analysis of what happened in cooalition.
He went on to say in Macroom: " ..... the socialist message of Labour is relevant. That message is simple. It is that the solution to our major prooblems lies in the direction of the plannned application of the commonsense of ordinary people."
Commentary: If this means that socialist message is the equivalent of the commonsense of ordinary people it is facile. If it doesn't mean that, what does it mean? It certainly isn't simple.
Another example of appallingly connvoluted speech is contained in an adddress of his at Newbridge on 17 Septtember. Following a thorough analysis of the nature of the unemployment probblem, he went on to outline what Labbour's policy was on the issue:
"Planning is essential. By planning we do not mean a reheated, repackaged version of the discredited Economic Programme of the past. We mean a coohesive national strategy for economic and social development based upon clear and democratically accepted goals with policy instruments and planning structures designed to mobilise all secctors in a true partnership in their purrsuits."
Commentary: Almost certainly this was written by Halligan, and it means that their version of planning is a reeheated, repackaged version of the disscredited economic programme of the past. A lthough why they describe it as discredited is rather odd as the basic idea of planning involving participation by all sectors of the community was ennnunciated in the summer of 1976 by the author of the "discredited" economic programme, Ken Whitaker. Indeed, the passage is almost borrowed entirely from a speech he made then.
Cluskey goes on: "The role of the state sector is cruucial.. .... A new charter for our nationally owned enterprise must be written and implemented without delay. Central to the strategy of the state sector must be the creation of a powerful State Deveelopment Corporation with a clear public mandate to stimulate, lead and co-ordinate all aspects of public involvement in the areas of iniative, new enterprises and job creation."
Commentary: Impressive wordiness, but all it means is that the hoary old State Development Corporation is being wheeled out again. It might or it might not be of some relevance to the unemmployment problem, but we really need to know a good deal more about what Halligan has in mind and ever since he read something about a Spanish or Italian SDC in an OECD report a few years ago he hasn't been able to eluucidate any further.
We need to know how is this going to be financed? Will it hive off finance from the private sector? What precisely will it do - grow tomatoes through the first language, run the telephone system, take over Bula or what? Will it compete with the private sector and if so on what terms, where will the managerial experrtise come from? What are the job proojections of the enterprise etc., etc? But above all, will it involve a transfer of resources from the private and public sectors and if so to what extent, and what will the consequences be?
He goes on: "Private enterprise's role must be accepted and fully supported "
Commentary: Can you really have it both ways? If the SDC is to mean anyything then private enterprise will have to be curtailed in some respect or other. Of course, there is one way out of part of the dilemma foreign borrowing. Is that what they have in mind?
And in conclusion: "One simple sentence has been used to sum up the economic and social poliicies of our party. That tells us that full employment is the basis of all these policies" .
Commentary: Full employment has been the policy of all Governments in this part of the world for at least 20 years. There is nothing uniquely socialist about this and if this sums up all the Labour Party is about they should stop confusing us by referring to themselves as socialists and call themselves "Butskellites" after the phrase given to the jointly held policies of one-time Tory chancellor Rob Butler, and right wing labour leader Hugh Gaitskell.
On November 29 he told another Labour audience:
"The role of political protest is an attractive role for some but it is not the path of the Labour Party. We are in politics to change society, to transform it and to make it more just and equiitable. We have positive goals and objecctives, not negative ones and these can only be realised through the achieveement of power in Government".
Commentary: Phrased thus, it is not clear whether Labour's objective is to create certain conditions in society or to attain power in governmnet. As the party tirelessly (and significantly Z} point out, it commands the support of less than 12% of the electorate and therefore it must choose between being a protest party for the foreseeable future or opting for another coalition. Clearly Cluskey wants another coalition on the pretext used repeatedly in the post '69' period, viz. that it is better to achieve some of your policies than none of them. But the only possible rationale for taking part in coalition is if one's party's ultimate aims are advanced thereby. Cluskey himself has admitted that coalition did not advance socialism, so either his objective is not socialist or he just wants power. Certainly the refusal to examine just what went wrong in coalition smoothes the way to an uncritical alliance with Fine Gael yet again.
In his budget speech, the Labour Finance Spokesman, Michael O'Leary offered not a single suggestion either as an alternative to Fianna Fail's budgetary proposals or as independent Labour policies on job creation. He did make a one line reference to the State Developpment Corporation and he ended by supporting the National Wage Agreeement proposals of a 5% wage increase Han 8% increase is now being rejected by his own union, the ITGWU. He did make a lot of play about the abolition of the Wealth Tax, which he treated mainly as a symbolic rather than a substantive move, making the negotiaation of the wage agree men t more diffiicult. There was' certainly nothing uniquely socialist or uniquely anything about that coritribution.
John Horgan gave the most thoughttful contribution from the Labour benches. He went to the core of the socialist case by insisting that the priivate enterprise emphasis in initiative was mistaken. There was high motivaation in public industry without the monetary initiatives of private enterprise He quoted Brian Nolan of the Central Bank noting: "of every £100 of wealth created in this country £1.50 goes to the poorest 10% of Irish households and £26.80 goes to the richest 10% of Irish households".
Horgan paraphrased the argument: "the income of the top I 0% is 20 times greater than that of those in the bottom 1 0%. He challenged the Lemass doctrine that rising tides lift all boats. Horgan said: "you have to be in the boat in the first place and many can't afford the price".
And he pointed out that while the Government was seeking reciprocity from the working class for income supplement and tax reliefs, there was no reciprocity sought of those who were given rates remission.
Horgan is the most noteworthy acquisition by the Labour Party, cerrtainly since 1969 and arguably since long before that. He was an outstanding
Michael O'Leary: doesn't know journalist with The Irish Times both as religious and education correspondent. He has the analytic ability to isolate the key issues in our society, but has he the socialist commitment to apply socialist remedies to them?
He has certainly identified the critical issue of the mal-distribution of wealth and countered the inherited wisdom about rising boats. Horgan is a potential successor to Cluskey and in the not too distant future, but his temperament ill disposes' him to the innfighting usually accompanying such change-overs.
The other notable newcomer to the Labour ranks in the Dail has been Ruairi Quinn who made one of the most reactionary speeches heard in recent memory from the Labour benches in the budget debate.
He said:
"I accept that the primary task connfronting this community is the creation of wealth. I reject rather traditionalist attitudes on either side of the House which would suggest that the redisstribution of existing wealth would satisfy the aspirations of even 30% or 40% of the population, let alone a majority of the population. The wealth is riot here".
Commentary: Horgan's argument about the price of getting into the rising boats takes care of that point.
Quinn went on to argue that the private enterprise system couldn't create rShfficient jobs in our community as it was not able to make the same amount of wealth as it did in the Victorian era, because of all kinds of social legislation and the strength of trade unions.
He rounded things off by attempting to make a snide remark about Martin O'Donoghue by commenting: "Acadeemics in Government are not a great recipe for success". Charlie Haughey couldn't let that one pass from a spokessman for the Conor Cruise O'Brien, David Thornley, Justin Keating party.
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Labour Party Special Report - An Uncertain Future
By: Vincent Browne
Tags: Labour, John Ryan, Fine Gael, Ruairi Quinn, Conor Cruise O'Brien, Northern Ireland
ALTHOUGH IT IS an absolute inevitability that Fianna Fail will lose up to 6 seats in any future election the new electoral commission will certainly substantially reduce the hefty "bonus" of seats they won over their proportion of the votes - it is by no means certain that Labour will be the beneficiary.
In the normal course of events it should reasonably expect to pick up three seats extra in the Dublin region, especially if the internal orrganisational difficulties have been sorted out. But the threat posed to a politiccally ambiguous Labour Party by Garret Fitzgerald's social democratic appeal could mean that Fine Gael would take these extra seats. Why should anyone vote for a social democratic Labour Party led by Frank Cluskey when they could vote fot a social democratic Fine Gael PartlY led by Fitzgerald?'
Fitzgerald also threatens to take a few Labour seats around the country. The first at risk must be Ruairi Quinn in Fitzgerald's own constituency. Garret must surely be expected to take an extra seat here for Fine Gael, and Fianna Fail isn't going to lose its one.
Then there is the problem posed by Jim Tully and Dan Spring both of whom are unlikely to stand again. Both have ambitious sons but again why should the Meath and North Kerry electorate opt for these in preference to Garret Fitzgerald's sponnsored candidates?
John Ryan of North Tipperary and Joe Birmingham of Kildare could also be in trouble. Though both are asssiduous constituency workers, their sea ts are highly marginal and in neither constituency does Fine Gael have a seat.
Thus in sheer electoral terms Labour urgently needs to establish an identity of its own, quite distinct from Fine Gael. The only way to go is leftwards and this would have the additional bonus of staving off the threat of the new Socialist Labour Party.But there are credibility problems involved. How does the party explain away its record in Government as an uncritical collaborator in repressive legislation and measures, in the cock up of natural resources, in the enthusiastic support for private enterprise, etc.etc?
It is difficult to see Labour making any progress at all without a critical and thorough analysis of the failures of the Coalition Government and there doesn't seem to be much willingness for this at present.
Then hard decisions must be taken on the role of public and private enterrprise and the distribution of wealth. The central issue in Irish politics is not. as Ruairi Quinn insists, the creation of additional wealth but, as John Horgan has pointed out, the disstribution of existing wealth. The party must make up its mind on wealth taxes, on maximum wages etc. before it can presume on any credibility.
Then there is the Northern issue.
The party has traditionally suffered from ambuguity on this score and Conor Cruise O'Brien's influence on the party has served mainly to isolate itself further from the sizeable reepublican/socialist element in society. There is also a direct relationship between the unity issue and the socialist questions. The unity question involves facing up to exploitation and corruption which are endemic to Northern society as do the sociallist issues to those same elements in Southern society.
Frank Cluskey's efforts to get off the O'Brien hook have been maladroit and disingenuous - he deserves only ridicule when he pretends that there are no divergences of opinion between himself and O'Brien, when O'Brien contends that one shouldn't work for unity and Cluskey says unity is the objective.
And then there is the problem of Labour's traditional failure to appeal to rural constituents, except through the medium of very much non sociaalists independents. Agriculture has assumed an even more central importtance in Irish politics since en try to the EEC and the spin off agri-business is vital to any job creation programme:
Labour, as with all political parties, have downgraded this central importtance - an idea might be to give its ablest member, John Horgan, ressponsibility for the agricultural porttfolio. And finally, Labour has got to make its mind up about how it is going to regulate its own affairs. Cluskey's recent remarks about the need for internal discipline are none too enncouraging and suggest that the paranoid streak is again gaining ascendency ,
The carefully stage managed agenda for its forthcoming conference gives no reason to believe that any of these issues will be tackled. If this is not soon rectified, then the party of Connolly, Larking and O'Brien may extinguish in the crush between Fine Gael and the SLP.