Setting Boundaries to the march of the nation

Bertie Ahern is confronted by an impasse in the  peace talks, a potential backbench revolt over proposed changes to Articles 2 and 3 and medio cre performances by many of his ministersy. Vincent Browne and John Drennan
Rarely in Irish politics have the stakes been as high for a political leader as they are now for Bertie Ahern. This month his role in the Northern peace talks will be crucial in determining their success or failure. And, in the event of an outcome to those talks, he will be expected to deliver to his party and his State, in support of the most substantial change in the Irish Constitution since its enactment, a change that may shatter the remaining “core value” of his party.

Already several backbenchers are lining up to protect “the soul of Fianna Fáil.” Among them is the new deputy for Dublin South West, Conor Lenihan, who has expressed outright opposition to any change to Article 2 of the Constitution. Others to voice their misgivings are: Cecilia Keaveney (Donegal), Brendan Kenneally (Waterford), Seamus Kirk (Louth), Noel O Flynn (Cork North Central) Batt O Keeffe (Cork South Central), Denis Foley (Kerry North) and Liam Aylward (Carlow Kilkenny). The attitude of cabinet minister, Síle De Valera may also be in doubt as the proposed Constitution changes go to the substance of the Constitution devised by her grandfather, Eamon de Valera.

Bertie Ahern's qualities of conciliation, patience and modesty certainly will be useful. However, his inexperience with Northern politics and his unfamiliarity with the ideologies and ideas that are at the heart of the proposed constitutional changes may prove to be crucial liabilities.

Although any proposed changes to the Constitution, in the context of an overall settlement on Northern Ireland, would win the support of the overwhelming majority of the Dáil, his government could still fall over the issue. This could arise from defections from his own party and the loss of support for his government from Independent TDs such as Jackie Healy Rea and Harry Blaney.

Quite apart from the issues arising from the Northern talks, the popularity of Bertie Ahern's government (as represented in the very favourable opinion poll ratings) may prove illusory. Certainly, that was the message from the Dublin North and Limerick East by-elections in March. Although the government presides over continuing spectacular economic success, there have been a series of blunders and poor ministerial performances which suggest that this government is as mediocre as any of recent memory.

As reported by Fionnuala O Connor (on page 28), the Northern talks are in deep crisis (at the time of going to press) and the prospects of there being any deal emerging from the talks are few. But, more crucially, there appears to be a prospect of a return by the IRA to violence, inspired not just by the failure of the talks but by the breakdown of the pan-nationalist consensus.

The position is that the IRA agreed to abandon (or suspend) the “armed struggle” to enable an “unarmed struggle” to emerge which would be underpinned by a coalition of the Dublin government, the SDLP and Sinn Féin. Now the perception, among republicans, is likely to be that not alone has the “unarmed struggle” got nowhere but the consensus that underlay that strategy has broken down.

That breakdown was represented not just (and not even primarily) by the Dublin government's part in the suspension of Sinn Féin from the talks for three weeks but, crucially, by the Heads of Agreement document released by the Irish and British governments on January 12. That document downplayed the significance of the proposed North-South body and appeared to have been inspired by an anxiety more to keep David Trimble in the talks than by loyalty to the consensus that was at the heart of the “unarmed struggle” strategy.

From the perspective of the process begun by Charles Haughey in 1990 and continued by Albert Reynolds – a process designed to draw the republican movement away from violence and into democratic politics – this was a major and perhaps fatal mistake.
And, for that, Bertie Ahern was largely culpable.

Personnel changes in the Department of Foreign Affairs didn't help and the re-appointment of David Andrews as Minister for Foreign Affairs was also unfortunate. Not that Andrews was not seen to have been a success when in Iveagh House from 1992 to 1994 but because it was Ray Burke and not him who had done the groundwork for Fianna Fáil on the peace process when the party was out of office from 1994 to 1997 and it was Ray Burke who had the surer hand in the management of the process.

Andrews was not Bertie Ahern's first choice as Foreign Minister to replace Ray Burke. He indicated immediately prior to Burke's resignation that Noel Dempsey would be promoted. Apparently, it was Mary Harney's influence that secured the restoration of Andrews to Iveagh House.

The only distinguishing characteristic of Fianna Fáil nowadays is its identification with “the nation” and the only test of that is support for the right to national self-determination on the part of Irish people as a whole. It is difficult to see how that can be easily disentangled from support for Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution as they stand.

In Opposition from 1982 to 1987 Charles Haughey defined the party largely in terms of its credentials on the “national question”. He took a hard line on the New Ireland Forum report, insisting on the objective of a unitary state for Ireland. He vigorously opposed the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, in part because of its acknowledgement of the principle of consent. Of course he backed off that position when returned to government in 1987 but the legacy of that re-affirmation of republican faith has left its mark.

A simple Constitutional Amendment inserting the principle of consent into Article 3 might not cause difficulties but it is likely that, on the insistence of the Unionist Party, a more comprehensive change will be required, almost certainly removing or radically changing Article 2's definition of the national territory.

Bertie Ahern's political accomplishments and experience are substantial. As Minister for Labour he was instrumental in instituting the national partnerships that have been a key factor in bring about the recent economic success. As Minister for Finance he continued the work of his two predecessors, Ray McSharry and Albert Reynolds, in stabilising the public finances, another key ingredient of the success.

But nothing in his abilities or background – not even his conciliatory gifts – equips him to wage the ideological wars that will be ahead if Articles 2 and 3, along possibly with other Articles and the Preamble, are to be changed radically. He is no idealogue and for that matter, not much of a nationalist either.

Bertie Ahern's performance as Taoiseach will be gauged hugely on how he performs on the Northern issue in the next two months. His performance otherwise has been uncertain.

He dithered on the Ray Burke issue, neither supporting him adequately when he first came under fire, nor pulling the rug from under him when his position became untenable. In truth, he should not have appointed Ray Burke to the cabinet, certainly not to Foreign Affairs (in spite of his work on the portfolio when in Opposition) where his negotiating position in the Northern talks was undermined by the torrent of rumours and revelations.

He also dithered on the nomination of Albert Reynolds as the Fianna Fáil Presidential candidate. Only belatedly did he intervene to prevent what could have been a very damaging Presidential bid by Albert – damaging from the party's perspective – and even then he dithered personally and ended up limply voting for the candidate he least wanted to nominate - Albert.

He also acted lamely on the issue of the Moriarty inquiry. His own instincts were to open all the Ansbacher accounts to investigation but, over a four hour meeting in his Department, he was browbeaten by officials from the Department of Finance and the Central Bank and agreed to curtail the investigation.

The funding of the drugs crisis programme was another fiasco, only narrowly averted. He says privately that a priority of his is to deal with the drugs problem and with socio-economic deprivation – priorities that ought to be dictated anyway by his constituency, which is the poorest in the country. But he allowed the focus of the budget to veer away starkly from these priorities and rescued the drugs initiative only at the last resort. The initial Rainbow pledge of £20 million was reduced to an allocation of £1.25 million before a furore in his constituency saw the pledge raised to £30 million. Nine months into the Government's term of office the money still hasn't been allocated; the cabinet subcommittee dealing with the issue has only met three times, and heroin is as plentiful in Dublin Central as ever.

The impression given by the government generally is one of lassitude. The legislative output has been minimal, the days of a Rainbow White Paper a week are long gone.
Charlie McCreevy has been the minister most on top of his brief but even he has been in trouble. His delivery in his budget on election promises was at once impressive and disquieting – impressive because of fidelity to the manifesto, disquieting because of the social implications of the rich man's bias. His renowned political judgement deserted him on the credit unions tax proposals. His street-wise response to the Ansbacher and NIB revelations have done him no service either.

John O Donoghue was the highest profiled of the Fianna Fáil front bench in Opposition. He has been virtually invisible since coming into office. The discovery that perhaps we do not have a quite so pressing a crime problem seems to have disoriented him – the level of reported crime dropped by 10 per cent in 1997, according to the Garda Commissioner.

O Donoghue's zero tolerance policy has evaporated. Jim Higgins of Fine Gael cut closest to the bone as he said ‘O Donoghue had evolved into a ‘zero Minister'.

Michéal Martin in Education has benefited hugely from the £250m Investment Technology fund and from the initiative of his predecessor, Niamh Bhreathnach, in sorting out the thorny issues of early retirement for teacher and the Universities Bill prior to losing her seat.

Mary Harney hardly seems to have recovered her nerve from the calamitous election campaign of last June. On many issues she appears always to be a report away from taking a decision. She has been decisive however on the National Irish Banks revelations and in the appointment of an inspector to investigate the Ansbacher accounts. Less so in the handling of the RyanAir dispute that closed Dublin airport in March for a weekend.

Most of the others have been, like John O Donoghue, invisible - for instance, Dermot Ahern, Noel Dempsey, Brian Cowen.

Perhaps what we need generally, at a time of self-generating economic growth, is a laid back government, one that doesn't interfere. A government of invisible ministers. If so that is what Bertie Ahern's government is giving us.

But there are two areas where government intervention could have effect: in transport and in housing.

Mary O Rourke has been moderately impressive in her handling of Telecom and Cablelink but one doesn't have a sense from her that one of the major problems of our time – the traffic chaos – is being handled by someone who knows what to do or has the vigour to find out. Noel Dempsey gives a similar impression in relation to housing in the Department of the Environment.

The “vision thing” has gone from Irish politics, expect perhaps on Articles 2 and 3.

The electorate – or that floating part of it - seems indifferent to who forms the government, with a slight bias against whoever is in office. This government in its comprehensive mediocrity is offering no reason why that bias should not again prevail.