The thoughts of Chairman Jack Lynch

Geraldine Kennedy presents a glossary of Jack Lynch's statements on Northern and constitutional policies over the last decade, revealing that he has maintained a consistency - almost - on the Northern question but has vacillated on the constitutional issue.
THERE HAVE BEEN subtleties of emphasis in Jack Lynch's statements on Northern Ireland over the last 10 years but with one significant exception, the basic themes have reemairied consistent: the identification of the 'root problem' as partition, the unremitting desire of the Irish people for unity and the desirability of the British Government declaring its interest in encouraging the unity of Ireland by agreement.

He has equivocated on the issue of the presence of British troops. He said prior to their introduction to the streets of Belfast and. Derry: "neither would the introduction of Brittish troops be acceptable", ·but in November 1972 he was counselling against their premature withdrawal.

The Fianna Fail policy statement of October 1975 (see panel) called on the British Government" to encourage the unity of Ireland by agreement, in independence and in a harmonious relationship between the two -islan ds, and to this end we declare Britain's commitment to implement an orddered withdra wal from her involvement in the Six Counties of Northern Ireland."

But within days of the policy being announced, Lynch was reetreating from it. In a statement on November 2, 1975 he distorted the announcement of a few days before. His version of the policy statement was that Fianna Fail had merely called on the British Government to encourage the unity of Ireland by agreement and, when this had been done, to implement it by an ordered withdrawal from involvement. He ignored the call to the British Governnment to declare its commitment to implement an ordered withdrawal from Britain's prolonged involvement in the Six Counties.

Lynch's touchiness on this point was well exemplified at his July 6, 1977 press conference on t:1C first day in office of the new Fianna Fail Government. As pointed out in the October issue of Magill, he said that "Flanna Fail made it clear in the policy statement of October 1975 that we were urging that the British Government might declare their interest in the ultimate unification of Ireland and that they might take some specific steps in this direction."

He was asked if these "specific steps" would include a declaration to a commitment to withdraw and he replied: 'No, I never said that.' True he never said it, but his party did.

Another questioner at that press conference asked: 'In pressing the Fianna Fail policy on the possibility of a declarration of intent to withdraw from Northern Ireland on reppresentatives of the British Government... , Mr Lynch interrrupted to say: 'I want to say at the outset that we never made such a policy statement.'

Clearly, the phraseology is slightly different but in essence Fianna Fail did call on the British Government to declare its intent (or rather commitment) to withdraw (or rather impleement an ordered withdrawal). But it has been on changes.in the Constitution that Mr Lynch has been most equivocal.

In his Tralee speech of September 1969 he said that he was prepared to explore all possibilities on a new connstitution for a new Ireland. In his bail statement of June 1970 he conceded that the Constitution might be legitimately seen as infringing upon civil liberties and we should try to accommodate and moderate our Constitution arid 1.1 ws acccordingly. At the Fianna Fail Ard Fheis in February 1971 he said that the constitution of a United Ireland should be a document in which no element of sectarianism should occur, thereby again conceding that perhaps the present connstitution had eiements of sectarianism in it. He went on to speak of grasping nettles which may sting our pride:

Following the prorogation of Stormont in March 1972 he made his most forthcoming stateement on constitutional change when he said: "these initiatives impose on us an obligation of a response touching constitutional, legal, economic and social matters." He went even further in his Foreign Affairs article when he said that preparation should be done on a new constitution now.

His attitude on the constitutional issue has hardened considerably since then.

In an interview with The Irish Times last December, he reverted to the long-fingered attitude on the .r - constitution, saying that it was only when· representatives of North and South came together to discuss the future of the country that constitutional change ought to be contemplated. There was no mention then of a need to 'grasp nettles', or of the obligation of a response touching constitutional matters, or of preparatory work being done on a new constitution.

Finally, the one major inconsistency on. Northern policy.

Following the Boland case on the Sunningdale declaration, the then Taoiseach, Liam Cosgrave, stated in the Dail on March 16th, 1974, that the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom could be changed only with the consent of a majority of the people of Norrthern Ireland. In his reply to this statement, George Colley, speaking on behalf of Fianria Fail in Jack Lynch's absence, assented to Cosgrave's declaration.

That assent conflicted with all Fianna Fail policy prior to then and since then, for the party never before or since has acknowledged the right to self-determination by a majority in Northern Ireland.

'THE ROOT CAUSE of the present trouble is the partition of our country' - statement at the Irish Embassy in London on the civil rights disturrbances in Derry, following talks on October 29th, 1968, with the British Prime Minister, Mr. Wilson, and the Northern Ireland Prime Minister, Capptain O'Neill.

'The first aim of Fianna Fail today is to secure, by agreement, the uniification of the national territory' ÐPresidential address to Fianna Fail Ard Fheis, Dublin, January 28th, 1969.

'It is clear that the Irish Governnment can no longer standby and see innocent people injured or perhaps worse .. .'

'It is obvious that the RUC is no longer accepted as an impartial police force. Neither would the employment of British troops be acceptable nor would they be likely to restore peaceeful conditions, certainly not in the long term .. .'

'Recognising, however, that the reeunification of the national territory can provide the only permanent soluution for the problem, it is our intention to request the British Government to enter into early negotiations with the Irish Government to review the present constitutional position of the Six Counties of Northern Ireland' ¸address on RTE following the battle of the Bogside in Derry, August 13th, 1969.

'The Government agree that the Border cannot be changed by force; it is, and has been, their policy to seek the re-unification of the country by peaceful means.... Nothing must be left undone to avoid a recurrence of the present troubles, whether in five or fifty years, but to continue to ignore the need for fundamental constituional change, so clearly necessary, could only have such a tragic result .. .'

'A solution along federal lines has been more than once suggested. My Government are ready and willing to discuss this possibility with the British Government' - statement on August 28th,l969, replying to the Downing Street Declaration of August 19th of the same year.

'Whatever the constitutional setting might be - and we are prepared to explore all the possibilities in connstructive discussion - the United ireeland desire is one in which there would be a scrupulously fair deal for all. The Protestants in the North need have no fear of any interference with their religious freedom or civil liberties and rights ...

It will remain our most earnest aim and hope to win the consent of the majority of the people in the Six Counties to means by which North and South can come together in are-united and sovereign Ireland earning interrnational respect for both the fairness and efficiency with which it is adminnistered and for its contribution to world peace and progress . . . It is quite unreasonable for any Unionist to expect my Government, or any future Govvernment, to abandon the belief and hope that Ireland should be re-united.' ¨Tralee speech, September 20th, 1969.

'We hope to achieve the position where unification would be possible with absolutely no material loss to the North' - Interview published on Octoober 6th, 1969, in the Director.

'I would not envisage federation with Britain as a possibility which would mean a scaling down of our desire for a united Ireland.' - speakking to reporters in Cork on October 26th, 1969.

'If I had any reason at all in coming into politics, it was to help in the reeunification of Ireland .. .'

'If one Irish soldier had crossed the Border, it would have opened up a carnage-the end of which would set us back not only decades but cennturies .. .'

'I am firmly and irrevocably opposed to force as a solution, even if we had the capacity, and everyone knows we have not got the capacity' - RTE radio programme 'This Week', Decemmber 28th, 1969.

'Partition is a deep, throbbing weal across the land, heart and soul of Ireland, an imposed deformity whose indefinite perpetuation eats into the Irish consciousness like a cancer'

'The certainty that peace is the only path to re-unification is not arrived at as a matter of expediency. It il the result of a careful, balanced, real istic assessment of all the factors in volved .. .'

'Until the ugly blooms of mistrust and suspicion which poison the atrnos phere have died and the ground h planted with the fresh, clean seeds o l friendship and mutual confidence, reo unification can never be more than all artificial plant rather than a burgeon ing blossoming flower. And so, I have said, our course is clear: amity, not enmity, is our ideal; persuasion, not persecution, must be our method and integration, not imposition, must be our ultimate achievement' - Speech at Fianna Fail Ard Fheis, January 17th. 1970.

'I speak now to the Irish people North and South, Protestant, Presbyyterian, Catholic - and simply Irish This whole unhappy situation is an Irish quarrel. I admit that others come into it either because they misunderrstand it or because they misuse it but they are not an essential part of it. We must settle this quarrel among us. I ask the Irish people of the majority tradition to recognise the truth of what I have just said. Let us not appeal to past gods as if past generations had said the last word about Ireland' ¨Address made on RTE on July 11 th 1970, a day before the Orange parades were due.

'In so far as there are constitutional difficulties which are legitimately seen by people to be infringements of their civil rights, then their views are worthy of intensive examination and. we' should try to accomodate them in our Connstitution and in our laws.' - Speech in Dail Eireann, July 28th; 1970.

'The Constitution of a united Ireland requires to be a document in- which no element of sectarianism, even unnconscious or unintended, should occur.'

'We wish to extend an olive branch to the North and we wish the North to accept it. If this means we must grasp some nettles which sting our pride, then we will readily do so if the result be a just and lasting peace throughout our island' - Address to Fianna Fail Ard Fheis, February 20th, 1971.

'This (the Constitutional claim to jurisdiction over the North) is fundaamental to our thinking ... Therefore, when I speak for the great majority of our people, even if I were so innclined, I could not abandon that claim, and personally I would not want to' Ø'Panorama' interview, BBC television, March 1st, 1971.

'It would take nothing away from the honour of Britain or the rights of the majority in the North, if the British Government were to declare their interest in encouraging the unity of Ireland, by agreement, in independence and in a harmonious relationship beetween the two islands.' - Garden of Remembrance speech on July II th, 1971.

'I believe that responsible opinion here and elsewhere will agree that the type of guarantee as to their connstitutional position given up to now to the Northern majority is not connducive to progress towards reconnciliation in the North and between North and South. Therefore, I believe that the guarantee should be reformmulated in such a positive way as to enncourage people to look for a lasting solution.' - Question Time, Dail Eireann, July 29th, 1971.

'My Government haven't recontemplated internment here at the moment. One can never say that that future action may not be necessary, but at the moment we are not contemplaating it.' Interview on RTE radio news, August 9th, 1971.

'In the event of the continuation of existing policies of attempting military solutions, I intend to support the policy of passive resistance now being pursued by the non-unionist population.' - Statement of August 13th, 1971.

'Negotiations, serious negotiations, must begin on the basis of finding agreed Irish unity in independence and in, as I have said before, a harmoonious relationship between Britain and a united Ireland. We must recognise too that such negotiations could be prootracted and complex ... ' - Speech to the Parliamentary Press Gallery Group in the House of Commons, December 6th, 1971.

'I impressed on Mr. Heath the need from his point of view to let the Irish people know that they are thinking in terms of Irish unity .... I asked him to indicate that this was something to be treated as official British policy.' - Comments on his return to Dublin, December 6th. 1971.

'The Government have called for the immediate withdrawal of British troops from Derry and from other areas in the North where there is a high concentration of Catholic homes.'

'We have also asked for a declaration of Britain's intention to achieve a final settlement of the Irish :question and the convocation of a conference for this purpose ... .'

'Subject to the approval of Dail Eireann, the Government have also decided to provide out of public money finance through suitable channels for political and peaceful action by the minority in Northern Ireland, designed to obtain their freedom from Unionist mis-government.' - Address to the nation, January 31 st, 1972.

'These initiatives (i.e. the prorogaation of Stormont) impose on us the obligation of a response touching connstitutional, legal, economic and social matters.' - Address to Irish Dental Association dinner in Killarney, April 14th, 1972.

'The 1937 Constitution as it stands is not suitable for a new Ireland. My own view is that it would be better to regard the new Ireland as an entirely new political entity which should work out and enact for itself its own connstitution. I do not say this because of a reluctance to consider the changes necessary for a new Ireland, but, on the contrary, because I believe that a fresh start could be a better approach. This would not, however, exclude preparatory work being undertaken now.' - Article on The Anglo-Irish Problem for Foreign Affairs, New York, June 20th, 1972.

'I would counsel against any hasty or ill-considered action. In particular, the premature withdrawal of British troops could precipitate a disastrous scale of violence and bloodshed.

'The aim of responsible leadership in all countries must be to avoid such an outcome. Given goodwill and an enlightened appreciation of the dimennsions of the problem, arrangements for the phasing out of committments, financial and military, should be posssible.' Debate at Oxford Union Society, November 23rd, 1972.

'I wouldn't support any arrangeement in which the possibility of the re-unification of Ireland wasn't a very important feature.'

'I think both sides will have to yield somewhat in the stand that they have taken. We want to see our people re-united; we want to see that done peacefully, with co-operation between both sides. We don't want the people of the North to come into our State as it is. We're prepared to adapt our situation to take account and accommoodate the views and traditions of the majority in the North of Ireland so that they could be fully absorbed as equals in an all-Ireland context. But, first of all, we'll have to unite people; afterrwards then we can look to the possiibility of getting these people, having been united as equals, working together towards a united political system.'

'(When there is reconciliation in the North) I hope it would be possible for the British very quickly to phase out the presence of their troops ... We believe that the British ought to now consciously set a programme that will bring them out of our country.' - ABC television interview, New York, January 8th, 1973.

'As a Republican party, it is our fundamental belief that the people should have the freedom and power to decide their own destiny. That is why our first goal is to seek the ending of partition and the re-unification of Ireland. This has been a central pillar of our policy since our foundation as a party and will continue until it is achieved.'

'Once it is appreciated that our party is committed to the ideal of the re-unification of this island by peaceful means and to upholding the Constitution of this country, it will be readily recognised why our party should have legitimate reservations on this particular paragraph', (of the Sunningdale communique which agreed that the status of Northern Ireland could be changed only with the connsent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland) Address to Fianna Fail Ard Fheis, Dublin, February 18th, 1974.

'Those of us who aspire to the peaceeful re-unification of Ireland acknowwledge the aspiration of the minority who seek to maintain the link with Britain. But their intransigent insistance that we should recognise that aspiraation as a de jure right" fails to take account of the deep-rooted feelings and basic aspiration of the great majorrity of the Irish people, North and South, and this can only perpetuate the historic agony of Ireland.' - Adddress to Cambridge Union debate, March 4th, 1974.

'The intransigence on the part of the Northern majority, who are such a small minority of all those who seek a realistic long-term solution, should give way to reason and this process could best be developed if British Government policy ceased to be negaative and became one of positive enncouragement of the idea of all Irish people coming together in peace and with justice.' - Speech at Cork City South-West Comhairle of Fianna Fail, June 7th, 1974.

'Failure to work for Irish unity is not only a negative policy, it is a dangerous one. It is a policy that will make the wound fester and the sore grow' - Addressing a Cairde Fail dinner in Dublin, January 30th, 1975.

'The soul of Fianna Fail is still anti-Partition .... I fully understand that Protestants in Northern Ireland want to maintain an identity. What I say is that they could, and can still do this, under a system that would repose authority in Ireland itself for the whole island.' Saturday Interview in The Irish Times, June 28th, 1975.

'The Fianna Fail statement had called, in the first place, on the British Government 'to encourage the unity of Ireland by agreement' and, when this had been done, 'to implement it by an ordered withdrawal from innvolvement'. No time limit had been set, and 'there was no suggestion of any precipitate action'. - Excerpts from statement of November 2nd, 1975.

'The purpose of the Fianna Fail statement (on Northern Ireland, Octoober 1975) is to point to the long-term solution 'the unity of Ireland by agreeement' and 'in a harmonious relationship between the two islands'. This is what we ask the British Government to encourage.' - Statement of December 15th, 1975.

'We seek an Ireland where the aspiraations and traditions of all denominaations and all legitimate interests are recognised and acknowledged under our laws and our Constitution.'  Golden Jubilee Commemoration in Cork of the founding of Fianna Fail, May 16th, 1976.

'We still believe that the best solution would be the solution in which the whole island, either in a federal or other kind of system, would be governned by Irishmen themselves without outside interference and I' believe that's possible in the long run. If any solution was to become integrated with the United Kingdom, I don't think I'd accept it.' - RTE 'This Week' interview, May 15th, 1977.

'Our position is that we desire the unification of the Irish people

and that the Irish people will manage their own affairs within this island without foreign or outside interference. That has been our aim and will conntinue to be our aim.' - First· major press conference of new administration, July 6th, 1977.

'In relation to Articles 2 and 3, to what you describe as the Republican ethos and to the form of Constitution that would be acceptable to Northern Unionists as a basis for the unity of Ireland, I adhere to the view that the time to discuss this is when elected representatives of North and South get around a table to discuss the future of the country, i ollowing an indicaation by the British Government of its interest in moving forward by enncouraging the unity of Ireland by consent and on the basis of agreed

structures. In these discussions, 1 the form of Constitution to underpin the institutions of State on which we would agree and to protect the basic rights of every individual, irrespective of creed or class, would be a central theme; every aspect of fundamental law would fall to be considered.'

'We would go a good distance to meet any fears or doubts - and would accept the most far-reaching safeeguards for those who believe themselves' to be threatened.'

'Pending developments along these lines, I certainly would not favour piecemeal amendments of the Constituution, proposed in the hope that they would advance the prospect of unity.' - Statement to The Irish Times, Deecember 29th, 1977 .•

Geraldine Kennedy is a reporter with The Irish Times