Noel Conroy Must Go

Noel Conroy should be removed as Garda Commissioner for the following reasons:

* In a submission to the Morris Tribunal on 10 May last he claimed the investigation into the death of Richard Barron was conducted "in an efficient and thorough manner" (the Tribunal characterised the investigation variously as "shocking" and "scandalous").

* He, along with the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Michael McDowell, has failed to implement the "urgent" recommendations of the first report of the Morris Tribunal, causing the Tribunal, in its second report, to republish its recommendations of the first report – this relates particularly to the issues of discipline and the culture of concealment and cover-up within the Gardaí.

* At least three gardaí against whom findings of the most serious nature had been made by the first report of the Tribunal remain serving members.

* He had personal culpability for a situation regarded in the first report as alarming: the operation of the key Crime and Security division at Garda Headquarters, of which he was head during a crucial period from 12 February 1992 to 3 June 1994. The first report stated: "The Tribunal is of the view that the direction of Crime and Security was not such as to inspire confidence". That comment alone should have caused the removal of Commissioner Conroy.

Failure to remove Noel Conroy from his position of Commissioner will signal a continuance of indifference on the part of the Government and the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform to the explosive significance of the findings of both the first and second Morris Tribunal reports.

The two reports together reveal negligence and incompetence on the part of a key division at Garda Headquarters, Crime and Security, on the part of Chief Superintendents and Superintendents of a shocking (to use an oft quoted word from the reports) dimension, plus indiscipline, chaotic personnel and industrial relations and corruption at more junior ranks.

In the first report, Mr Justice Morris warned that An Garda Síochana was losing its character as a disciplined force. He said: "Ultimately the gradual erosion of discipline within An Garda Síochana, is a developing situation that will, sooner or later, lead to disaster". That impression is massively reinforced by the second report.

While nine working parties were established under the auspices of Deputy Commissioner Fitzgerald, to study the first Morris report and it has come up with recommendations of its own, nothing concrete has been implemented. The sense of urgency spoken of in that first Morris report has been replicated no where by either the Garda leadership of the Department.

The Morris Tribunal is by far the most productive of all Tribunals. Established only in 2002, it has so far produced two substantive reports and now has only one major issue related to its terms of reference to investigate – the circumstances in which Frank McBrearty jnr made a false statement incriminating himself. The Moriarty tribunal which was established five years earlier, in 1997, has produced no report. The Planning Tribunal, also established in 1997 has produced only one report, and the Barr Tribunal, which ended its public sessions prior to Christmas has yet to report — the Morris Tribunal produced its second report just three weeks after it concluded hearings.

One of the rye comments of the report has been that the Oireachtas never debated its first report. It suggests that perhaps the Dáil and Senate might now get around to debating both reports and this, apparently, is due to happen shortly.

The two reports together convey a sense of a police force in utter disarray, undisciplined, in part corrupt, bound by a culture of concealment and lies (also, of course perjury). Michael McDowell and others have insisted the problem is merely one of a "few bad apples". The significance of the reports is that this is categorically not so. Not that a majority of even a significant minority of Gardai are personally corrupt but that the force as a whole is now enveloped in a culture that is itself corrupt, undisciplined, chaotic and unmanageable (at least as far as the present management is concerned). It recommends in this second report, as it did in the first report, that outside expertise be recruited from other police forces, notably from Canada. As a start off the new Commissioner should be such an outsider.

The scale of the malaise within the Gardaí is also such as to require a commission on the lines of the Patton Commission in Northern Ireland to examine policing here, police structures, and cultures. And then a police authority, taking away responsibility from the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform.

Vincent Browne