Fianna Fails Precarious Majority
There was a 5.72% swing* to Fianna Fail in the June election, but their majority is dependent on their performance in Government, writes Richard Sinnott.
(* Swing is calculated as the average of the percentage gain by one party and percentage loss by the other.)
Some indication of the nature of the Fianna Fail victory can be gathered by examining the swing in different areas of the country. The swing was largest in the Dublin region (city and county combined), at 8.34%. This completely upset the calculations on which the Coalition revision of the Dublin constituencies was based, since the setting up of three seater constituuencies assumed that the National Coalition could at least maintain its 1973 level of support and could accorddingly hope to gain two out of three seats in most cases. In fact, of 13 threeeseaters in the Dublin region, eight went two-one in favour of Fianna Fail and only five divided one-one-one or two-one in favour of the Coalition.
The pattern in the rest of the country confirms speculation that a further contributory factor was addverse reaction by large farmers to Coalition taxation proposals. Thus, the next largest swing after Dublin was in the rest of Leinster, proverbbially the area of lush grasslands and bigger farms, while the lowest swing was in the generally small-farm region of Connaught-Ulster-plus Clare. An additional factor is suggested if we divide the Connaught-Ulster-plus-Clare region into Border and non-Border areas. Despite the number of attempts to raise the matter, the internal security aspect of the Northern Ireland problem did not figure to any extent at national level. However, the fact that the swing to Fianna Fail was a negligible 0.32% in the Border areas of Connaughtplus-Clare, compared with 3.1% in the rest of. the region, suggests that the issue may have told against Fianna Fail in Border areas.
Confirmation of the big farmer factor and an insight into the urban swing is provided by analysis of the gains made by Fianna Fail within each occupational class. We can assess these gains by comparing voting intention during the campaign, as assessed by the Irish Times/No]' election surveys, with figures on party identification collected by Irish Marketing Surveys for RTE's "Survey" programme in September 1976. The distribution of "party identifiers" is pinpointed by means of a question which asks whether people usually think of themselves in politics as Fianna Fail, Fianna Gael, Labour or other. The comparison of these two sets of figures, set forth in Table 2, suggests that Fianna Fail gains were made towards the upper end of the occupational spectrum in both non-farm and farm sectors. The gains were 10% among large farmers compared with 1 % among small farmers, thus confirming the inference about the impact of the farmer taxation issue. The gains were 10% and 9% among the middle class (AB) and among the skilled working class (C2) reespectively, compared with 2% among the unskilled working class (DE).
All this might seem to lend weight to the argument that the basis of the Fianna Fail victory was a series of material hand-outs benefiting the better off sections of the community.
However, the Irish Times/OP surrvey evidence on both the material promises and on the major issues in the election, suggests that this is not the basic explanation of the Fianna Fail victory.
Of the three most prominently disscussed grants or concessions, i.e. rates, road tax and the £1,000 grant to first time purchesers of new houses, only the road tax propsal showed an discernible relationship to voting inntention. The rates proposals from each side were largely self-cancelling with 90% of people approving of both proposals. The £1,000 grant measure was little known even in the target 18-34 age group. Midway through the campaign only 16% of this group were aware of the proposal. In relation to the road tax proposal, 55% of those in favour indicated an intention to vote Fianna Fail. However even this slight relationship recedes in imporrtance when one considers the range of evidence indicating a strong connecction between opinion on the relative ability of each side to handle basic economic problems and voting inntention.
Evidence from Irish Marketing Surrveys on electoral opinion prior to the campaign indicates a high level of disssatisfaction with Government handling of the economy and, from September 1976 onwards, a growing belief that Fianna Fail would do better. Favourable reaction to the Budget of January, 1977 marked a comeback for the Coalition on this score and a narrowing of the gap in voting strength between the two sides. However, the respite was brief, and by April the' tide was again running in Flanna.Fail's favour.
The Irish Times/NOP surveys demonstrate the overwhelming predominance of economic issues in the minds of the electorate from the onset of the campaign. The crucial fact, however; is that, not only did people say these issues were important, they went on to inndicate a voting intention In accordance with the priority. of economic issues:
Thus, 80% of respondents intended-to vote for whichever party, they had said was best on economic matters, whereas on the other issues, significant proportions of those who, though t the Coaliition was best nonetheless intended to vote for Fianna Fail. All this suggests that the election was won on material issues arid material promises certainly, but these material factors were not simple handouts or free gifts but the very basic material issues of jobs, inflation and overall economic prosperity.
One final contributory, factor worth noting is the impact of the leaders of each .side, Mr Cosgraveand Mr Lynch. Satisfaction with Mr. Lynch as potential Taoiseach was much more widespread than satisfaction withMr Cosgrave 873%- endorsed Jack Lynch as Taoiseach in the event of a Fianna Fail victory while only 44% endorsed bam Cossgrave in the event of a National Coaliition victory. Significantly, disssatisfaction with the Cosgrave leadership seems to have had it bearing on people's voting intention. since 56% of those failing to endorse Mr Cosgrave indiicatedan.jiitention to vote Fiarina Fail compared with 40% of the much smaller number dissatisfied with Mr Lynch giving National Coalition as their voting intention.
The ingredients of the Fianna Fail victory then, were principally the belief that the party would handle the economy better, secondarily, the attraction of Mr Lynch as leader and playing a more minor but discernible role, the reaction of large farmers presumably to Coalition taxation proposals. FinaJ.ly, some, but certainly not extensive, support imay have been gathered by means of promises of specific grants and concessions.
What does this imply for Fianna Fail's future strategy and prospects? From a purely electoral poirit of view, it would be much easier for Fianna Fail if the victory had been won by From a purely electoral poin t of view, it would be much easier for Fianna Fail if the victory had been won by means of a straightforward set of material handouts. These, after all, are easy to deliver and presumably easy to reproduce in a slightly different form the next time out. However, as we have seen, these issues played only a very minor role rand so do not in any way provide a recipe for ensuring the same level of support in. future elections. Even the one block of support, that of large farmers; which was apparently based. on expected material concessions does not provide any comfort. Conntinued cultivation of that support would alienate larger' and more innfluential sections of the community and increase the potential for serious urban-rural conflict.
Given the evident popularity of the new Fine Gad Leader, Dr FitzGerald, another contributory factor to Fianna Fail success in 1977, i.e., a more popular leader, will not be assured in the next election. Hence it would seem that a sufficient basis for the consolidation of the Fianna Fail majority is not to be found in handouts, in wooing the farmers or in emphasizing leadership. Can it be found in the dominant issue of 1977, the issue of economic management?
Superficially it might appear that the dominance of a new issue coupled with very significant electoral gains by one party wouid fundamentally change the political situation and shift the balance of support in favour of that party.
However, the, character of the issue involved, in 1977 is crucial ill this regard:' It is of the nature of the issue that Judgement. is deferred pending evaluation Of future economic perrforrnance. Thus 1977 did not, as some elections do, establish a pattern and one party a safe, stable majority. It may have created the potential for such a stable majority but the actual majority it produced is precarious. It is precarious in the sense that it is conditional and the minimum conditions for its renewal are that the party fulfil, and be seen to fulfil, the very specific commitments it undertook in relation to employment, inflation and general economic prossperity.
Table 1
Swing to FlannaFall 1973-77
(as percent of Fianna Fail - Coalition vote)
Area Percent Swing
All constituencies +5.72
I Dublin City and County +8.34
II Rest of Leinster +7.35
III Munster less Clare +5.11
IV Connaught-Ulster plus Clare +2.16
Non-Border areas of Region IV +3.01
Border areas of Region IV +0.32
Source: Swing calculated from data in Ted Nealon Ireland: a Parliamen-
taryDirectory (Dubl in 1974) and Ted Nealon and Frank Dunlop
Guide to the 21st Dail and Seanad (Dubliri 1977)
Table 2
Comparison of Fianna Fail voting intention in May-June 1977
with party identification in September 1976 by oecupatlonal class
Occupational Class
All Middle Skilled Unskilled Farmers Farmers
class working Vvorking 50 acres less than
(ABc1) (C2) (DE) plus 50 acres
FF Id. '76 43 36 45 45 38 47
FF vote '77 49 46 54 47 48 48
Change +6 +10 +9 +2 +10 +1
Source: Party identification: RTE "Survey" - Politics Irish Marketing Surveys, Sept 1976.
Voting intention: Irish Times/NOP Election Surveys, May-June, 1977.