Democracy declines as the world moves into uncertainty

The tsunami that has killed more than 50,000 people in Asia and devastated the lives of millions across nine countries in the space of a few hours underscores the unpredictability of life and events. But some certainties endure.

A year ago, on 26 December 2003, another earthquake destroyed the city of Bam in Iran. More than 26,000 people were killed. There was an immediate humanitarian response by the international community, and then indifference. Today, most of the surviving 155,000 inhabitants of that city are still living in tents and temporary shelters in atrocious weather conditions. Commitments by the rich world to aid the poor world have melted before the new year has begun as Ireland has signalled its breach of a commitment that earned it a seat on the United Nations Security Council four years ago and the Bush Administration has announced a massive slashing of its foreign aid budget.

Thousands more will be killed in Iraq in 2005 as elections there in January will heighten sectarian rivalries between the Sunnis and Shiites. There may be progress in Israel with a new Palestinian leadership but so much there depends on the willingness of America to pressurise the Sharon government and that is uncertain, given the validation neo-conservatism has won in the American Presidential elections.

There will be several significant developments in the European Union in 2005. Among them a perceived crisis arising from the defeat of the draft EU Constitution in several member states. Also a realisation that the borders of the Union will extend far further than previously envisaged. This is not just because of the opening of membership negotiations with Turkey with a population of 65 million and the on-going negotiations with Romania and Bulgaria but also a new expectation in other countries on the eastern border of Europe of EU membership.

The "orange revolution" in Ukraine was inspired in part by what is known as the "soft power" of the European Union – the attraction of membership. It will be difficult to deflect that expectation, an expectation likely to extend to Belarus also as well as to the Balkan states Croatia, Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Albania.

So the European Union of twenty years from now is likely to be one of perhaps 34 member states and the institutional problems that have remained unresolved in this new draft Constitution are certain to cause havoc, a prospect that probably will become apparent in 2005.

There is the issue of the size of the Commission – a single commissioner for each State is already a nonsense in a Union of 25 members. But more significantly there is the democratic issue.

Essentially the European Union is controlled by the governments of its member states. These operate in secret within the Council of Ministers, responsible to nobody. Even if the secrecy were removed it would still be undemocratic because of the impossibility of holding any single government or individual responsible for the collective decisions of all governments.

The expansion of the European Union has deepened the undemocratic character of the organisation and the new Constitution has failed even to address the issue. Further expansion will make matters worse.

The only remedy is to democratise the Council of Ministers as a second Parliamentary chamber, akin to the US Senate, with all States having the same number of votes but with majority voting prevailing. This would be paralleled with an empowered Parliament, comprised of members representative of populations, as at present. But governments don't want to surrender their control over the Union so it won't happen. Democracy will decline.

There is another problem: the ideological underpinning of the whole European project. It is founded on the idea of the primacy of the free market, as though that is the optimum social arrangement. Markets are excellent mechanism for managing diverse choices but as instruments of fair distribution of resources they are manifestly deficient and unjust. No corrective mechanism is built into the edifice of the EU to compensate for resulting injustices. Enfeebled national governments will hardly be able to rectify that institutional unfairness. Problems, long term.

Another problem: Russia.

Russia's sense of isolation, exclusion and vulnerability is growing, side by side with the diminution of its own democracy and the rise of criminal corporatism. Its unhappiness with the "orange revolution" in Ukraine and the perception of EU meddling in Russia's "near abroad", its anxiety over America's development of a missile defence system – in breach of international treaties – and its own commitment to resuming the nuclear arms race, along with its murderous campaign in Chechnya, are all menacing developments, some of which are likely to cause crises in 2005.

At home, two by-elections in 2005 will hardly enliven the year. There will be tensions within Labour, the odd spat between Fianna Fáil and the PDs, rumbles from Tribunals, possibly the departure of Martin Cullen, Fine Gael claiming resurgence, crisis in health.

The peace deal on Northern Ireland will hinge a lot on the outcome to the investigation of the £22 million robbery. If it was the Provos, no deal until later in the year. If it wasn't the Provos, no deal until later in the year. One way or another there will be progress in Northern Ireland, possibly with Sinn Féin signing up to the police authority, which will be, by far, the most significant element of any peace agreement.

And one absolute certainty: predications are always wrong.

Vincent Browne