Back to the Drawing Board - Basis for agreement
Garret FitzGerald flew back to Cork last November following hIS summit meeting with the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, in London. He attended a function in the Southern capital on Saturday evening and on Sunday November 8 he travelled to Kilkenny to a poverrty conference organised by the Council for Social Welfare. There he delivered a speech which was to set him apart from all other senior members of his own party and was, indeed, a departure from his own record as Leader Of the Opposition. It was a speech which may also form the basis of a new Coalition arrangement, this time involving not alone the Labour Party but also, on an informal basis, the SFWP along with Jim Kemmy and Tony Gregory. FitzGerald said that Sunday in Kilkenny:
"It is tempting to take the view that further social proogress must await the resumption of significant economic gr~th, that we cannot afford to tackle the issue of povverty. That temptation is one I will strongly resist ... "The challenge of poverty in a society in recession is to focus attention on the need for redistribution from the haves to the have-nots. To those of us who are the haves this challenge is disturbing, and likely to be resisted. The challenge must nevertheless be met. "
It was the statement of a personal commitment which had been a genuine motive behind FitzGerald's entry into politics. In 1966, at the outset of his political career, he once told this reporter that his primary political objective was to bring about a radical redistribution of the nation's wealth, primarily through attacking the whole notion of innheritance - he saw no moral justification in the perpetuaation of wealth from one generation to another. That view was effectively stifled from that point onwards, as he made his way up through the political process. Shortly after he became leader of Fine Gael in 1977, he was saying that reedistribution could come about only through the retion of future increments of wealth - it should not disturb the existing distribution - and that, anyway, any attempt to redistribute wealth would have to depend on future economic growth. In an interview early in 1978 he argued that in a democracy where only .a minority (25.1 %) were "have nots," it was unrealistic to expect the majority to drop their living standards to help the poor.
In an interview in the April 1981 of Magill he stated that "in our present condition these problems (deprivation) can be realistically and effectively tackled only through an exxpansion of our resources by economic growth, and this must in logic be our primary objective."
The rationale.for FitzGerald's "re-conversion" has to do with the other dimension of his political make-up - that related to the creation of a pluralist society in Ireland as a precondition to uniting the country by persuasion. This latter strain to his political ideology found a much greater political welcome within Fine Gael, although there are still strong ultra-Catholic elements within the party. He wrote a book, largely concentrated on the pluralist Ireland theme, in 1972 ("Towards a New Ireland") and when Foreign Minister, made many speeches on the subject. Then, in a speech in Roscommon prior to the June general election he gave an indication, although not an entirely unambiguous one, that if elected Taoiseach he would seek to make proofound changes in southern Irish society. He said that "to resolve the crisis between Orange and Green remains, as it was for Tone and Davis, our most formidable challenge. I call today on the ardour and the generosity of our young people, and I invite them especially to join with us in what I believe will be the greatest adventure of our history. I innvite them, not to die, but to live and to strive for peace and friendship for this and future generations of Irish men and women."
On assuming office, FitzGerald was consumed by the HHBlock crisis and, immediately afterwards, by the crisis in the public finances. But once the former problem eased somewhat in mid-August (actually, the hunger-strike was still going on, but its intensity had diminished because the British had responded to pressure and the families of hunnger-strikers were intervening to save lives), he began to devote his mind to the broader dimension of what he saw as the main national issue. A meeting of senior ministers and officials was convened in Iveagh House to discuss the broader issue of Anglo-Irish relations (that is, apart from the HHBlock issue) and the North-South question.
Attending this meeting were the Taoiseach himself, Jim Dooge (the Foreign Minister), Peter Sutherland (the Attorrney General), Alexis FitzGerald (Garret's crony and special adviser), Dermot Nally (Secretary to the Government), Sean Donlon (Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs), Noel Dorr (Ambassador to the U.N.), Eamon Kennedy (Ambassador in London), David Nelligan (head of the Anglo-Irish Division in Foreign Affairs), Michael Lillis (special adviser to Garret on Anglo-Irish affairs) and Wally Kirwan (Assistant Secretary of the Taoiseach's Department with responsibility for the Anglo-Irish talks).
Through this discussion the broad thrust of policy on Northern Ireland was established, including the 'Committment in principle to launch a political campaign in the South to "de-sectarianise" Southern society.
Shortly afterwards, Val Dorgan of The Cork Examiner did an interview with FitzGerald for publication in a special supplement which that newspaper was printing to mark the opening of the Irish Fair at Bloomingdale's in New York. Dorgan, who is an astute political reporter, used the occaasion to get FitzGerald into areas unconnected with the purrpose of the interview and the Taoiseach obliged by talking about changing the constitution and, in particular, removving Articles 2 and 3.
FitzGerald didn't bother to tell anybody in his office about the nature of the interview, which was not published until several weeks later. Then, on September 18, the Evenning Press news desk rang the Taoiseach's Department, furrious that The Evening Herald had apparently been given a major political scoop in an interview with the Taoiseach on constitutional changes. FitzGerald denied giving any interrview to the Herald and then remembered the discussion with Dorgan - characteristically The Evening Herald had "lifted" the interview from The Cork Examiner without attribution.
An interview with RTE's This Week programme was scheduled for the following Sunday but before that, FitzzGerald hosted a luncheon for the political correspondents of the daily newspapers. There, he spoke to them quite openly about his views on the need for constitutional and other reforms but the correspondents understood the remarks were off-the-record.
FitzGerald was in a very demoralised mood at the time.
He believed that the lifetime of his Government was shorttlived and his wife, Joan, was in hospital suffering from a major spinal defect which caused her considerable pain. The Taoiseach spent all of his time, when away from his office, at her bedside and it appears that it was there that he decided that he should "go public" on his constitutional reform ideas before he was to lose office. (Actually, most of the decisions of the Government at that time appear to have been taken at that bedside in Vincent's Hospital.)
It was Sunday September 27 that he went on the air with-Gerry Barry and, when asked about The Cork Examminer interview, took off. Borrowing a line from a remark by Brian Lenihan on Today Tonight, the previous Thurssday, he said that it was his intention to lead "a republican crusade to .rnake (the Southern State) a genuine republic on the lines of Tone and Davis." He went on to remark: "If I were a Northern Protestant today, I cannot see how I could be attracted to being involved with a state which is itself sectarian,' not in the actuely sectarian way that Northern Ireland was ... but nonetheless the fact is that our laws and our Constitution, our practices and attitudes reflect those of a majority ethos and are not acceptable to Protestants in Northern Ireland."
It was a remarkable statement for the leader of the Sou~ern State to make and it evoked a remarkable reespo~e. The Taoiseach's office was literally deluged with telephone calls, letters and telegrams - virtually unaniimously' supportive. FitzGerald was elated by the response and his demeanour perceptibly changed. From being deepressive' and defensive, he grew in self-confidence - it was a liberation for him to have at last said something unequivoocal on an issue of central significance to his political being. It was this self-confidence which led him on to make that other remarkable statement of his Premiership - the speech on poverty in Kilkenny exactly six weeks later.
Throughout his period as Taoiseach, FitzGerald develooped a surprising friendship with a politician whose backkground was very different from his own, whose politics, were superficially very different and who was to be the cause of the downfall of his Government. Jim Kemmy and Garret FitzGerald had not known each other until the cirrcumstances of the hung Dail threw them together. As the months went by, the Taoiseach warmed to the Limerick Socialist - at one point saying to a confidant, "I have much more in common with this man than I have with most of my backbenchers." He sympathised with, if he didn't share, Kemmy's two nations theory on the Northern issue. He addmired Kemmy's outspoken condemnations of the IRA and he was at one with Kemmy, he believed, on the issues of re-distribution of power and wealth in Irish society. Kemmy reciprocated the admiration.
It was perhaps the feeling of friendship that led FitzzGerald to underestimate the pressures on Kemmy in relaation to the budget. Kemmy had stated his position on VAT on clothes and footwear, as well as food on subsidies and capital taxes, in advance but the Government appears to have dismissed the significance of his pre-conditions.
When Kemmy visited FitzGerald's office following the budget statement on January 27, Garret had prepared a hand-written analysis showing the re-distributive effects of the budget. Kemrny appears to be impressed although he gave no undertaking to FitzGerald to support the meaasures. The ,Taoiseach believed that the bond of friendship would see them through, along with pressure from Noel Browne on Kemmy - the two Independent socialist depuuties had been virtually inseparable since July.
But Kemmy had been under increasing pressure from his own organisation in Limerick and there were rumours of votes of no-confidence in him, following his support for the July budget and the raising of the school entry age and his vote against the moving of the writ for the CavannMonaghan by-election. Four members of Kemmy's local organisation accompanied him to Dublin for the January budget and it was with these that he went into conclave, following his visit to the Taoiseach's office. They were, apparently, adamant that the budget would have to be opposed and Kemrny clearly felt that he could not defy them - he may, of course, have in tended to vote against the budget anyway.
But the basis of an accommodation between FitzGerald and the radical Independents now exists and in this regard the friendship that built up between Kemmy and FitzzGerald may become crucial in the negotiations that will go on over the next two weeks before the meeting of the Dail on March 9.
While FitzGerald has many of the qualities required for exemplary leadership, he also possesses a politiical, maladroitness which has always threatened to overrwhelm him. The best recent example of this has been his handling of the matter of Haughey's Government's dealings with the public finances in the first half of 1981.
The evidence of the falsification of the January 1981 estimates for public expenditure is well-documented. John Bruton first pointed out the absurdity of many of the figuures in his speech opposing the budget at the time. Several economic commentators did likewise. When FitzGerald came into office on June 30 he was immediately presented with all the official and documentary evidence he needed to substantiate even the most serious of charges against his political opponent. Yet he hesitated and dithered, for reassons which to him appear to be in the national interest. He seems to have genuinely believed that the disclosure of the full truth about what was done would jeopardise the counntry's international credit rating.
More probably, the reason why he did not disclose what he knew had to do with guilt feelings towards Haughey arising out of his speech in the Dail in December 1979 on Haughey's nomination as Taoiseach. Then, FitzGerald had referred to Haughey's "flawed pedigree" and in opening his speech he expressed the hope he would be equal to his task, "recognising how much I cannot say, for reasons that all in this House understand." It was a mean and vicious speech one which evoked naked outrage even from within Fine Gael. FitzGerald quickly perceived how unfair it had been and had built up a huge sense of guilt as a consequence. It seems probable that this feeling made him reluctant to throw the book at Haughey over the latter's behaviour from January to June 1981. •
FitzGerald was informed of exactly what had happened at the cabinet sessions preceding the 1981 budget within days of his coming to power. Thus, he was then aware of the events of the Ha ughey cabinet meetings in Barretstown, the subsequent paring of 5% off the estimates without any consequent decisions to cut public expenditure, and the distortions on the estimates for public service pay and for unemployment assistance. He was also informed of the deetails of the subsequent Government decision to increase public expenditure by a further £200m., for which no fiinance was provided, and then the final unauthorised appro-val of a further £90m. of expenditure in the immediate runnup to the election. Furthermore, he became aware at this early stage of the correspondence between the Department of Finance and the Central Bank about the loan application.
He was genuinely daunted by the size of the problem in the public finances but unsure about what to do politically .
He allowed John Bruton and Gerry L'Estrange to make speeches on the Haughey estimates but he failed to do anyything himself and, above all, he failed to co-ordinate any Government propaganda exercise on the issue.
FitzGerald brooded a lot before his television duel with Haughey and it was only on the week-end before the connfrontation that he asked for the documentation about the falsification of the budgetary estimates to revive his memmory of exactly what transpired.
On the day before the television debate, he met Alexis FitzGerald, his adviser, Sean O'Leary, the Fine Gael Direcctor of Elections, and Liam Hourican, the Government Press Secretary. They discussed the line of attack he should adopt but there was no detailed discussion on how he should conduct the debate for fear of stultifying him. Garrret was very nervous, even at that stage, about what he in-
tended to reveal concerning Haughey's conduct of affairs and it appears that this nervousness heightened prior to the debate.
He made a complete mess of the evidence he produced
"on Barretstown and the Central Bank correspondence in the debate - Haughey easily turned the allegations aside. But once FitzGeral1:1 was over that hurdle , he got into his stride, especially in the second half of the debate.
At the press conference the following day, he was again nervous and hesitant. He had in front of him the corresspondence between the Department of Finance and the Cenntral Bank, intending to use them had Haughey explicitly denied that the loan application had ever been refused. As Haughey had not done so, FitzGerald simply didn't know what to do with the information and in the event, made an impression of evasiveness and hesitancy which vastly unimmpressed the assembled media representatives.
Garret FitzOerald is this peculiar combination of ideallism and maladroitness. The idealism may provide the basis for a deal with the SFWP, Kernrny and Gregory - the malladroitness may frustrate even the best intentions-of all concerned. •
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Tony Gregory
Tony Gregory is a 34 year-old' who worked until the election, at Colaiste Eoin, Stillorgan Road Booterstown. He has indicated that he will work as a full-time public representative.
Gregory entered politics in 1966, joining Sinn Fein. When the movement split he went with the officials (now SFWP) where he spent one year on the Ard Comhairle of the party as a delegate from the Dublin Ceanntar. He drifted out of the party around 1972 and since then has drifted around the fringes of the left-wing parties. While he claims that he has not been a member of any party since then he has been involved with noth the Irish Republican Sociualist Party and the Socialist Labour Party, although his committment to both was luke warm and wa a matter of ideological identity rather than activism.
His links to the IRSP revolved around his personal friendship with Seamus Costello. Several years after Costello's assassination, Gregory still, had an IRSP poster commmemorating Costello hanging on the wall of the house in Ballybough which he shares with his brother Noel.
Prior to the local elections in 1979 his first attempt tat election, there was speculation that Gregory would stand in Dublin Central as a Socialist Labour Party candidate. However, Gregory had assiduously built up local support through his involvement in local issues and had no wish to jeopardise the potential support from the many community activists in the city centre who are ectreemely suspicious of political parties. In the event, Gregory refused to stand inder the SLP banner buut suggested that the party should refrain from standing a candidate in the area and should support him instead.
Gregory was elected to Dublin Corporateion in 10979 and has usually voted with the only SFWP reppresentative there, Tomas McGiolla.
Gregory's politics centre around communityissues which the run down city centre has thrown up. Shortly after his election to Dublin Corporation he was arrested along wiht several people who had blocked local streets against traffic in protest at the conditions in the area, He has also been involved with youth employment shemes, protecting local amenities fighting illegal flat development etc.
Gregory left Official Sinn Fein primarily because he felt that they had moved away from republican principles but the national question is very much subservient to his concentration on local politics. He was not, for instance, involved in the last year's H-Block campaign. On economic issues he lines up with the broad left, propagating ICTU strategy on taxation.
In his cultivation of his local base Gregory has antagonised activists of the left bu his obvious detrermination to win seats in both City Council and Dail. Within SFWP there is sonme animosity towards Gregory at local level but it is lileky that this can be overcome within the structure of teh Dail, with Gregory taking a position close to that of SFWP on most of the social and economic issues that will arise, but not in the national question.