Debating the 'good' society
Political philosophers need to become public intellectuals once again. Book review by Joseph Mahon.
Political philosophy may be defined as a rigorous analysis of the concept of the good society. In this connection, philosophers sometimes distinguish between a good society and the good society.
A good society has at least some, and perhaps many, of the things one would want any society to have; for example, a good health service, a good education system, and good public transport. But the society in question might also be marred by high levels of unemployment, and inadequate access to the arts.
The good society, on the other hand, is pre-eminently good; it has everything, or almost everything, one would wish a society to have. It is the good society in this latter sense which is the subject matter of political philosophy.
The philosophical tradition has given four broad answers to the question about the good society. They are as follows: [i] the good society is democratic; [ii] the good society is free; [iii] the good society is a society of equals; and [iv] the good society is just.
Those who hold that the good society is a free society are called libertarians, while those who hold that the good society is a society of equals are known as egalitarians. Libertarians further hold that liberty and equality are incompatible, and that liberty should take precedence over equality. Egalitarians agree that liberty and equality are incompatible, but then take the reverse position that equality should be given precedence over freedom. Yet a third faction, known as liberal egalitarians, hold that freedom and equality are somehow reconcilable; that it is possible to pay homage to both ideals without sacrificing either.
So far as the two distinguished authors of this book are concerned, Jan Narveson is a libertarian, while James Sterba is a liberal egalitarian. Sterba's position is the more intriguing, and less obvious, of the two: he holds, somewhat paradoxically, that the supposed antipathy between freedom and equality is a mirage; that what is really involved is a clash of two conflicting freedoms, and that one of these freedoms trumps the other.
A free society is one in which everyone is free to earn and accumulate as much as they can, without government interference, regardless of the consequences for others and where, as a consequence, some end up living sumptuous lives while others end up living lives which are depleted and miserable.
Reactions to this version of society vary dramatically. Some, especially those on the Left, react with moral outrage. Others, especially those on the Right, see no injustice in such a society, because everyone is free to earn and accumulate as much as they can; because inevitably some will do better than others in the market zero sum games, and because those who do badly still do better than they would fare in any other type of society.
Those on the Left are motivated by the following thoughts:
[i] There is no justice in such a society: a society which is marked by conspicuous, untrammelled affluence on the one hand, and widespread misery and deprivation on the other [or even any misery and deprivation] is unjust and decadent.
[ii] In the free society, some have far more freedom than others. Basically, some have far more money [and/or credit] than others and, as a consequence, have far more opportunities for action. Money buys you things - broadly, possessions and experiences - which lack of money forces you to forfeit or forgo. How can a libertarian support a type of society that denies so much freedom to so many?
[iii] Poverty carries with it a lack of freedom, not just a lack of the means to exercise freedom.
[iv] In the free society, significant numbers of citizens suffer ill-health needlessly, die prematurely, drop out of the education system long before their peers, suffer consistent and not just relative poverty, and are more likely than their counterparts in more egalitarian societies to end up in prison. These harms are less common in more egalitarian societies. Therefore these harms are avoidable. Avoidable harm should be avoided. These harms can be avoided by having a more equal, and less free, society. Therefore, a more equal, and less free, society is desirable.
It seems to me that this is a debate that Sterba cannot win. This is because he insists on meeting the libertarian on his own ground. All the libertarian has to do is advance any one, or combination of, the following propositions, and the libertarian egalitarian is left floundering:
[a] In a free society, everyone has the right to earn and accumulate as much as possible. So, there is no inherent injustice in the system.
[b] Since everyone has this right, or opportunity, taking forcibly from those who have earned and accumulated most is theft [Narveson, an ironic twist on the Marxist axiom that property is theft].
[c] If the free society is a democratic one, then there are institutionally legitimated ways of restricting the incomes and assets of the rich and the super-rich. The main democratic instrument for doing so is taxation, which enables democratically elected governments to redistribute income and wealth among their populations. Taxation is not theft, because it is the policy initiative of governments who have been elected in free and fair political contests. By the same token, if governments tax lightly, then that is the free and fair outcome of the democratic process, and must be accepted.
The true egalitarian can, and needs, to approach the matter in any one, or amalgam, of the following ways:
[i] Equality is pre-eminently desirable in itself, since it demands that all human beings be treated with the same degree of consideration and respect.
[ii] In a free society, everyone does not have an equal right, or opportunity, to earn and accumulate as much as they can. The odds on doing so are heavily stacked against the have-nots, particularly in such crucial areas as education, disposable income, health, life expectancy, cultural capital and occupational networking.
[iii] Equality trumps freedom, but it is possible to pay homage to equality while leaving many, a great many, substantive freedoms intact.
[iv] Redistributing income and wealth among the dual population that has emerged historically from the industrial revolution is desirable, because it ensures that avoidable harms are avoided. In fact, extensive research has shown that societies with lower levels of income inequality are better for everyone, not just the have nots. (See The Spirit Level.)
Narveson and Sterba are two distinguished, senior political philosophers. The analytical political philosophy which they favour and practise is highly abstract and technical, almost - though not entirely - devoid of empirical content. The net effect of this approach to political philosophy is that they, and other professional philosophers, will not get to participate in the great political debates about public policy. So we are left with a lose-lose situation: the profession and the discipline suffer, while public debate is weaker than it would otherwise be. It is time for professional philosophers to become public intellectuals once again.
Are Liberty and Equality Compatible? For and Against
Jan Narveson and James P. Sterba
Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp 265
The above is an abridged version of the full review which can be read below. Joseph Mahon lectures in the Philosophy Department of NUI, Galway. He is the author of An Introduction to Practical Ethics; Existentialism, Feminism and Simone de Beauvoir; and Simon de Beauvoir and Her Catholicism. He is currently writing a book on culture and the state.