On 27 November 2012, the Eurogroup (comprising the Eurozone’s finance ministers) reached a decision on Greece. Its essence is a guarantee that Greece will remain in the Eurozone (and therefore off the Northern European agenda) for another ten to twelve months; at the very least until the German federal political cycle has seen through the election of a new Bundestag. The repercussions of this short-sighted agreement are grave not only for Greece but for the Eurozone, and indeed the European Union, more broadly.

The Greek government, under intense pressure from the troika of its lenders (IMF-EU-ECB), is about to give the wheel of depression another, powerful turn. At a time when national income is shrinking at a rate not seen since the Great Depression in any post-feudal society, in an economy where the circuits of credit (not just the banking sector) have been utterly and truly dismantled, and against a background of the greatest fiscal squeeze ever attempted in peacetime, Greece’s creditors are imposing upon the country another fiscal contraction even greater than before.

It is the height of misunderstanding to fear that public investment distorts markets and crowds private investment out; the reality is one of highly distorted markets that are clearly incapable of fostering adequate levels of private investment. By Yanis Varoufakis.

Getting the ball rolling in the right direction for Greece requires a government in Athens that is capable of looking its German partners in the eye and not blinking for a few minutes. But New Democracy won the day on a promise to blink from the outset. By Yanis Varoufakis.

For Greece, bargaining is infinitely more sensible than pleading, particularly when the Troika is terribly bad at knowing where its own interests lie. By Yanis Varoufakis.